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CIVIL PROCEDURE
M. MINNETTE MASSEY* AND MARION WESTEN**
The express purpose of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
This goal will only be realized when those who practice in the courts are
so familiar with their provisions that the rules become the tools of those
who use them and not stumbling blocks to needless litigation.
One is dismayed at the number of cases in which the issue before
the appellate court concerns a point of procedure. It is apparent that
many of these cases need never have been decided if only the Bar, and
even the Bench, had read the rules.
This article surveys1 the more important and interesting cases,
amendments to the rules and legislative acts that have occurred during
the period. The format follows that of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.2 The first major division is Actions at Law and Suits in Equity-
law and equity. (Prior to the discussion of the rules and their judicial
interpretation, there are contained in this division sections on Statutory
Process, Notice Requirements and Venue.) The other major divisions
are Actions at Law Only, and Suits in Equity Only.
The outline of the Survey is as follows:
I. LAW AND EQUITY ......................................................... 746
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
C. Setting Aside a D efault ..... .......................................... 797
D . Interpleader .......................................................... 797
E . R ehearing ............................................................ 798
I. LAW AND EQUITY
A. Statutory Process and Notice Requirements
1. QUASI-IN-REM JURISDICTION AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
If a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its power to
adjudicate the rights of parties before it is predicated upon the presence
of the defendant's person or property within the state, thereby rendering
the defendant amenable to personal or constructive service of process
under a valid statute.3
When jurisdiction is based upon the presence of property within
the state, satisfaction of the obligation is limited to the value of the
property subject to levy and execution.'
In Matz v. O'Connell" an action was brought on a promissory note
that had been secured by a real property mortgage. The mortgage had
been previously foreclosed by a suit in which the defendant mortgagors,
who were Pennsylvania residents, had been constructively served with
process.6 No objections were made to the sale which resulted in a defi-
ciency.' In a subsequent law action on the note in which there was per-
sonal service of process upon the defendants, the court refused to allow
the introduction of evidence relating to the value of the property sold
and claimed that its value had been conclusively established by the price
at the foreclosure sale to which no objections were made within the
statutory 10-day period. In reversing, the appellate court held that the
defendants were not collaterally estopped from establishing the value of
the property sold in the subsequent law action. Since the court in the fore-
closure proceedings did not have personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ants, the jurisdiction of the court was merely coextensive with the
property. No personal rights could be determined in that action without
depriving the defendants of due process. 8 It necessarily followed that the
provision establishing conclusive presumption of value under the fore-
closure statute was inapplicable in the absence of personal service of
process on the defendants.
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Jones v. Jones, 140 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). In State v. Dekle, 137 So.2d 581
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), satisfaction of a judgment by levy and execution 'against previously
attached property, was denied where the State Department filed a suggestion of sovereign
immunity after judgment had been entered but prior to execution.
5. 155 So.2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). See Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida
1957-1963, 18 U. MiAmi L. REV. 269, 290 (1963).
6. FLA. STAT. § 48.01(1) (1963).
7. FLA. STAT. § 702.02(5) (1963).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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2. IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS
It appears to be established that witnesses and suitors in attend-
ance in court outside of the territorial jurisdiction of their resi-
dence are immune from service of process while attending
court and for a reasonable time before and after going to
court and in returning to their residence.9
The privilege not to be served with process extends both to judicial
and to quasi-judicial proceedings. 10 There is an exception to the immunity
rule which permits service of process in litigation incidental to or corre-
lated with the subject matter of the proceedings for which the defendant
had specially appeared. To find such correlation as would permit service
of process, there must be substantial identity between the parties in both
actions and between the issues in the two proceedings. When, for exam-
ple, the defendant in one suit is a corporation and the defendant in the
other is a natural person, there is not such substantial identity of the
parties as to invoke the exception to the privilege of immunity."
3. ACTING WITHIN JURISDICTION
In determining whether jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
and foreign corporations can be obtained by substituted service, 2 Florida
bases the constitutionality of its long arm statutes on the minimum con-
tact rule.'3 The "doing business" requirement is difficult to apply, and
also service of process on corporate officers, agents, and individuals fre-
quently presents problems under these statutes. Such problems found
in recent cases have been carefully analyzed in Part I of the current
Survey of Florida Law.' 4
4. UNINCORPORATED VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
An unincorporated voluntary association is not a legal entity. Juris-
diction over the members of such an association can only be acquired
by individual service of process upon each of the members. 15
9. Lienard v. DeWitt, infra note 10, at 43.
10. Lienard v. DeWitt, 143 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), aff'd, 153 So.2d 302 (Fla.
1963) (Workmen's Compensation proceedings).
11. Ibid. See also Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida 1957-1963, 18 U. MI.A L. REV.
269, 291-92 (1963).
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16, .161, .162, .17, .171, .30 (1963).
13. The rule, first enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in Hutchison v. Chase and
Gilbert Inc., 45 Fed. 139 (2d Cir.,1930), and adopted by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida 1957-1963, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 269, 278-89
(1963).
15. Walton-Okaloosa-Santa Rosa Medical Soe'y v. Spires, 153 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1963). See Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida 1957-1963, 18 U. MIAMt L. REV. 269, 286
(1963) (re: partnerships).
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5. COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Strict compliance with the statutory provisions is a prerequisite
to valid service of process. In Florida Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. Spires 6
process was served upon an individual who was also president of the
Florida Medical Association, a domestic corporation, but the return did
not indicate that he had been served in that capacity. In reversing a trial
court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, the
district court held that the court had acquired no jurisdiction over the
defendant corporation where its president was not expressly served in
his representative capacity.'
A mortgage foreclosure suit was instituted in Dade County where
the encumbered property was located and the mortgagor resided at the
time of the execution of the mortgage. Before the suit was begun the
mortgagee had moved to a different county within the state. After due
and diligent search and inquiry, service of process was by publication.18
In affirming a lower court order denying the defendant's motion to quash
the constructive service, the appellate court held that the defendant's
presence within the state (and amenability to personal service)' 9 did
not defeat the service by publication when the record indicated com-
pliance with the requirements of the publication service statute. °
6. AMENDMENT OF THE SHERIFF'S RETURN
In the much litigated case of Brown v. M11itchell2 the supreme court
quashed 2 the district court decision23 which had sustained the service
of process upon an incompetent because the record to the supreme
court failed to establish strict compliance with the statutory require-
ments for service of process upon incompetents. 4 Such service must be
made either by reading the summons to the incompetent and also to
his guardian, or by delivering a copy thereof to the incompetent and
his guardian and by further delivering another copy to the guardian ad
litem appointed by the court.25 On remand of the cause to the circuit
court, the defendants deposed2 1 the sheriff by whom service on the in-
competent and his wife had been made nineteen years previously and
petitioned the circuit court for leave to amend the sheriff's return to state
the truth as allegedly revealed in that deposition. The motion was denied
16. 153 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
17. FLA. STAT. § 47.17(1) (1963).
18. FLA. STAT.. § 48.01(1) (1963).
19. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3.
20. Johnstone v. J. W. English Enterprises, Inc., 155 So.2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
21. Massey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. MIAmi L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1962).
22. Brown v. Mitchell, 119 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
23. 114 So.2d 178 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1959).
24. FLA. STAT. § 47.25 (1963).
25. Ibid.
26. FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.21.
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on the ground that the supreme court decision had finally determined
the matter and the circuit court was without jurisdiction. From this
order, the defendants took an interlocutory appeal and the plaintiff
petitioned for a writ of prohibition in the supreme court which was denied.
The district court reversed the order appealed (i.e., the order denying
the defendants' motion for leave to amend the sheriff's return) on the
ground that neither it nor the supreme court had previously decided
the question, and it remanded the cause with directions to the circuit
court to consider the defendants' motion on the merits. After a hearing, at
which the sheriff testified, the amended return was received into evidence,
and the chancellor entered an order finding that it doubly complied with
the statutory requirements for service of process upon incompetents.27
He also ordered that in the foreclosure proceedings the circuit court had
had jurisdiction over the incompetent and that the court's prior summary
decree for the plaintiff be set aside. Thereupon, the plaintiff appealed.
The district court affirmed 8 the order setting aside the interlocutory
summary decree when the record, as amended, established proper service
upon the incompetent in the foreclosure action, thus raising genuine
issues of material fact that precluded entry of a summary decree.
B. Venue
Venue statutes have often been characterized as statutes of con-
venience. Their primary purpose is to require that litigation be
instituted in the forum which will cause the least amount of in-
convenience and expense to those parties required to answer and
defend the action. 9
1. IN GENERAL
Florida's principal venue statute3 0 provides that an action shall
be begun only in the county (1) where the defendant resides, or (2)
where the cause of action accrued, or (3) where the property in litigation
is located.81 The statute's plain language has not precluded the necessity
for judicial interpretation.
An action for breach of oral warranties, negligent preparation of
a vessel for a voyage and rescission of a contract was brought in Escam-
bia County where the plaintiffs retained possession of the vessel that
27. FLA. STAT. § 47.25 (1963). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
28. Brown v. Mitchell, 151 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
29. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So.2d 609, 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
30. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1963).
31. Colburn v. Highland Realty Co., 153 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). Suit for the
specific performance of a contract to sell Florida land was brought against the Michigan
receiver of an non-resident vendor. The court had acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
by his voluntary appearance to obtain a stay of execution and enforcement of an adverse
summary decree. Venue in the county in which the real property in litigation was located
was proper.
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was the subject matter of the litigation. The alleged oral warranties
had been made in Broward County where the boat was purchased and
in which one of the corporate defendants maintained its principal place
of business and the individual defendant resided. The principal place
of business of the other corporate defendant was in Dade County. From
an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint from improper
venue, the defendants took an interlocutory appeal. 2 In quashing the
order appealed and remanding the cause with directions to transfer"3
the action to the Broward County Circuit Court, the district court held
that a transitory action may not properly be maintained in the county
where the property in litigation is located and where neither the defend-
ants reside nor the cause of action accrued.
Venue statutes are for the protection of the defendant where
the action is personal or transitory, and unless waived, the stat-
ute grants to the defendant the privilege of being sued either
in the county of his residence 4 or in the county where the cause
of action accrued. The primary cause of action, (if any) . . .
accrued in Broward County, and venue, on this ground lay in
Broward County. 5
2. VENUE IN CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING FROM CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A recurring venue provision "6 permits an action to be brought in
the county in which the cause of action accrued. In breach of contract
actions, the breach ordinarily occurs in the county where the contract
was to have been performed, absent circumstances indicating a contrary
intention.
7
The state brought an action on behalf of a material-man against
a general contractor, his surety, and the sub-contractor for breach of an
agreement between the sub-contractor and the material-man. The agree-
ment, to which the general contractor was not a party, had been made in
Hillsborough County. The work was performed in Leon County. From
an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for improper
venue"8 the defendants took an interlocutory appeal. In affirming, 9
the district court held that where the contract provided for payments to
be made in Hillsborough County, a cause of action arose there on de-
fault in the payments, and the action could be maintained.
32. FLA. App. R. 4.2. Petition for certiorari to review an order dismissing a complaint
for improper venue will not lie where plaintiff may obtain review by a direct interlocutory
appeal. Tel Serv. Co. v. Hendricks, 139 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
33. FLA. STAT. § 53.17 (1963).
34. Where two or more defendants reside in different counties the action may be
brought in any county where any defendant resides. FLA. STAT. § 46.02 (1963).
35. Richard Bertram & Co. v. Barrett, 155 So.2d 409, 412 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 46.01, 46.03, 46.04 (1963).
37. Williams v. Scholfield, 144 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
38. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) (3).
39. Winchester v. State, 134 So.2d 826 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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3. LOCAL V. TRANSITORY ACTIONS
Much of the litigation relating to venue has arisen in connection
with the classification of an action as local or transitory.
Actions were deemed transitory when the transaction on which
they were founded might have taken place anywhere, and local,
when the transaction was necessarily local, and could have hap-
pened only in a particular place. The unerring test by which it
may be determined whether an action is local or transitory,
inheres in the nature of the subject of the injury as differing
from the means whereby or the place at which the injury was
inflicted.40
Applying this test, Florida courts have held4' an action to foreclose
a chattel mortgage to be transitory. Payments on a promissory note were
to be made in Broward County. The note was secured by a chattel mort-
gage on personal property located at the defendants' places of business
in Dade County. On default in the note payments, the plaintiff instituted
foreclosure proceedings in Broward County Circuit Court which trans-
ferred the suit to the Dade County Circuit Court. In reversing the trans-
fer order, the appellate court noted that a cause of action arose in
Broward on default in the payments. Under the applicable venue sta-
tute,42 an action may be maintained against a corporate defendant, either
domestic or foreign, in the county in which the cause of action accrued.
4. VENUE IN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE SUITS
Where a cause of action arises is a factual question for the court to
determine from the individual circumstances of each case. In a suit to
enjoin the alleged infringement of a registered trademark, for damages,
and for an accounting of profits, the court43 held that "a cause of action
accrues in any county where the act of unfair competition is com-
mitted. 4 4 Offering the allegedly infringing articles for sale in shops far
distant from -their place of manufacture is an act of unfair competition
that entitles the plaintiff to maintain an action in the county where the
goods were sold even though the corporate defendant maintains no place
of business and the individual defendants have no residence in said
county. It is seriously to be questioned whether such a broad definition of
a cause of action is compatible with the purpose of the venue statute to
protect the defendant from unnecessarily inconvenient litigation.45
40. 25 STD. ENCY. PROCEDURE 858 (1911).
41. Lucco v. Roller Corp., 151 So.2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
42. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1963). Accord, Edgewater Drugs, Inc. v. Jax Drugs, Inc., 138
So.2d 525 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
43. Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
44. Id. at 313.
45. These considerations may have motivated the dissenting justice to find that the
only cause of action arose in Dade County, where the individual defendants resided, the
1964]
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5. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Although Florida has no statute comparable to the federal act 46
providing for transfer of a cause from one district court to another in
which the action might have been brought for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses in the interest of justice, Florida courts do recognize
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.4 7 However, under the Florida view
of the doctrine, its application is strictly limited to cases of complete
diversity-i.e., diversity between the parties and a cause of action not
arising in the state.
An action to recover damages for personal injuries was brought
against a foreign corporation in Dade County where its resident agent
resided. The plaintiff resided in Hillsborough County, and the accident
occurred in Alachua County. In reversing an order dismissing the com-
plaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the appellate court
held that:
where the Legislature provides that an action may be brought
in a certain court,48 that court may not. impose its will as to
venue in order to force a plaintiff to accept another forum for
the action, which the courts conceive to be better than one spec-
ified by the Legislature .... The reason . . . that the doctrine
has been applied in Florida to non-resident plaintiffs is because,
as to such plaintiffs, there is no statutory right to bring the
action in any particular forum.
49
6. UNSECURED PROMISSORY NOTES
An action upon an unsecured promissory note can be maintained
only in the county in which it was signed by one or more makers or in
which one or more of the makers resides, regardless of where it was ac-
cepted or payments are made.50
The district court applied the general principle of statutory con-
struction that a special statute covering a particular subject is con-
trolling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other
subjects in general terms, and affirmed a lower court order granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue in an
defendant corporation maintained its principal place of business, where the alleged in-
fringing labels were placed on the bottles, and from which the goods were shipped.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
47. See Note, 15 U. MiAmi L. Rav. 420 (1961). Under the common law doctrine, unlike
the statute, dismissal, rather than transfer, results when the court decides that the litigation
has been brought in an inconvenient forum. See also Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida
1957-1963, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 269, 292 (1963).
48. Under FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1963), an action may be brought against a foreign corpora-
tion doing business in this state in any county where such company may have an agent.
49. Touchton v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 155 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
50. FLA. STAT. § 46.05 (1963).
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action upon an unsecured promissory note. The action had been insti-
tuted in the county where the default in payments had occurred."'
7. SUITS AGAINST STATE AGENCIES
The defendant in an action arising out of an automobile collision
filed a compulsory counterclaim and joined the appealing cross-de-
fendant as a necessary party.53 The original action was brought in Duval
County against a Florida non-resident and the cross-defendant was a
state agency, maintaining its offices in Nassau County. From an order
denying its motion to dismiss the compulsory counterclaim, the cross-
defendant took an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court reversed.54
An action against a government agency is essentially local and cannot
be maintained in a county other than that in which the agency is situ-
ated, unless the agency has waived its venue privilege. The requirement
is predicated on reasons of policy and intended to promote the efficient
and economical operation of the agency.55
In the case of administrative agencies, an exception to the general
rule (which first developed in relation to municipal corporations) is
expressly provided by the built-in venue provisions56 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Under these provisions, an affected party may obtain
a judicial declaration of the validity of any administrative rule by bring-
ing a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of the county in
which such party resides or in the county in which the executive offices
of the administrative agency are maintained.5 7
When no provision has been made for direct review by the supreme
court, appellate review of administrative orders entered in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings is possible by a timely petition for certiorari
to the district courts in the appellate district which includes the county
wherein the administrative hearing was held, or if venue cannot thus
be determined, in the appellate district wherein the agency's executive
offices are located.
58
The Florida Milk Commission brought an action for a declaratory
judgment in the circuit court of the county in which it was located to
determined the validity of an order that it had entered requiring the
defendant to resume payment of its former prices to its producers. The
defendant took an interlocutory appeal from an order denying its motion
to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. In denying the motion the
51. Woodley Lane, Inc. v. Nolan, 147 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
52. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1).
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(8).
54. Amelia Island Mosquito Control Dist. v. Tyson, 150 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
55. 38 Am. JuR. Municipal Corporations § 716 (1941).
56. FA. STAT. §§ 120.30r.31 (1963).
57. FLA. STAT. § 120.30(1) (1963) ; Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962).
58. FiA. STAT. § 120.31(1) (1963).
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trial court had relied on the special venue provisions in section 120.30(1)
of Florida Statutes. The defendant contended that the general statute
regulating venue in actions against domestic corporations was control-
ling, 9 and that, under that statute, the suit should have been brought
in Escambia County where the defendant corporation maintained its
business office and the contracts complained of were made. It argued
that the plantiff agency was not a proper party to bring an action for
a declaratory judgment under -the Administrative Procedure Acte° and
that the order for which an interpretation was sought was not a proper
subject for a declaratory judgment. The district court agreed6 and re-
manded the cause with directions that it be transferred to the Escambia
County Circuit Court.6" The declaratory judgment provision6" permits
an affected party to bring an action to determine the application, mean-
ing or validity of an administrative agency's rule. Within the purview of
this section, an affected party is one whose rights are affected by the
rule, and does not include the agency which adopted it. A rule is a "rule
or order of general application adopted by an agency which affects the
rights of the public or other interested parties." '
8. LEGISLATION
In re-enacting the principal venue statute, 5 the Legislature deleted
the paragraph which required a plaintiff, who brought an action in a
county where the defendant did not reside, to file a good faith affidavit
alleging that the action was not brought with intent to annoy the de-
fendant. The statute now reads:
Suits shall be begun only in the county (or if suit is in the
justice of the peace court, in the justice's district) where the
defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or
where the property in litigation is located.66
The statutory alteration renders moot such decisions as Cobb v.
Santa Rosa County"7 in which failure to file the required good faith
affidavit was held to be grounds for dismissal unless it was filed within
a short day as fixed by the trial court.
C. Circuit Court Local Rules
The Florida rules authorize the circuit courts, subject to the ap-
proval by the supreme court, to adopt local rules concerning practice
59. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1963).
60. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1963).
61. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
62. FLA. STAT. § 53.17 (1963).
63. FLA. STAT. § 120.30(1) (1963).
64. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, supra note 61.
65. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1963) ; Fla. Laws ch. 63-572, § 12.
66. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1963).
67. 146 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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and procedure. In an independent suit for modification of a divorce de-
cree the presiding judge reassigned the case to be heard by the judge
who had granted the original decree. The plaintiff contended that she
had the election to file her petition for modification in the original action,
or that she could file a new and independent suit and, if she adopted
the latter course, she was entitled to have her cause heard by the judge
presiding over the division the cause had been assigned to under the
blind filing system. The appellate court affirmed 68 the reassignment and
opined that local rules are authorized69 and that it was clear that the
local rule 70 relied upon was valid and applied to the facts of the instant
case.
D. Commencement of Action
1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A civil action, except an ancillary proceeding, is commenced when
the complaint is filed. 71 Further, the statute of limitations is tolled by
the filing of the complaint.72 Federal decisions 73 require compliance
with the rules providing for the filing of the complaint 74 and the forth-
with issuance of summons, delivered for service71 in order to toll the
statute of limitations. This federal position was argued to -the first dis-
trict in Hawkins v. Bay County Publishers, Inc. 76 The complaint was
filed and summons was issued one day before the running of the statute
of limitations. Process was delivered to the sheriff more than four months
later and was at that time served upon the defendant. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that the statute of
limitations barred the action. The appellate court found no evidence in
the record, nor was any finding made by the trial judge as to who had
withheld the summons or why it was withheld from service. The appel-
late court did not resolve the issue of the necessity of delivering the
summons for service as a prerequisite for tolling the statute of limita-
tions. It held and reiterated that the statue of limitations is an affirmative
defense which must be pleaded and cannot be asserted as ground for a
motion to dismiss the complaint.
68. Morrison v. Morrison, 136 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
69. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.1(d).
70. RULES OF PRACTICE n CIRCUIT COURT OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA (1961) reads as
follows:
7. (e) Cases previously Non-suited, petition for bills of review or to vacate or
set aside prior proceedings, or cases where the merits have already been heard by
a Judge of this court; may be reassigned by the Presiding Judge to the Judge before
whom the first case was filed.
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.2(a).
72. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1959).
73. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE gf 3.07 [4-3-2] n.5 (2d ed. 1961).
74. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.2(a).
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(b).
76. 148 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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2. IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS
The immunity rule provides "that witnesses and suitors in attend-
ance in court outside of the territorial jurisdiction of their residence are
immune from service of process while attending court and for reason-
able time before and after going to court and returning to their homes.""
The plantiff, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries al-
legedly resulting from the defendant's assault in North Carolina, peti-
tioned for certiorari to review a district court decision78 affirming the
lower court's order dismissing his complaint without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant's person. The district
court of appeals had held that when the non-resident defendant has
responded to a request to appear before the deputy industrial commis-
sioner in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding against the plaintiff's
employer corporation to recover for injuries allegedly growing out of
the same North Carolina altercation, he was immune from service of
process, and that the facts were not such as to bring the defendant within
the exception to the immunity rule. In affirming79 the district court's
decision, the supreme court found it necessary to overrule the earlier
decision of L. P. Evans Motors, Inc. v. Meyer."° The supreme court
agreed that when there was no identity of parties or issues in the two
proceedings, the defendant was not subject to service of process on his
appearance within the state. However, the court rejected the district
court's third requirement-that there be a substantial identity of pros-
pective results.
In Lawson v. Benson8' a non-resident filed a proceeding in Florida
against an ex-wife for relief relating to child custody. It ended ineffec-
tively and the plaintiff filed another custody proceeding in a different
county. While prosecuting the second proceeding he was sued for fees
by the lawyer who had represented him in the earlier proceeding. His
motion to quash the service and dismiss the cause, on the ground that
he was immune from service of process, was granted and affirmed on
appeal. The appellate court held that a non-resident who was in Florida
as a party and witness in his child custody proceeding against his former
wife was immune from service of process, even though the attorneys'
fees were connected with a prior, unsuccessful child custody proceeding.
3. SERVICE OF NEW AND ADDITIONAL CLAIMS ON DEFAULTING PARTIES
Rule 1.4(a) expressly requires pleadings which assert new or addi-
tional claims for relief against parties that default be served upon them
77. Rorick v. Chancy, 130 Fla. 442, 178 So. 112 (1937).
78. Lienard v. DeWitt, 143 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
79. Lienard v. DeWitt, 153 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1963).
80. 119 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
81. 136 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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in the manner provided by law for service of summons. This requirement
is based upon notions of fairness, namely, that a party should receive
notice of all claims for relief upon which judgment may be entered
against him. Hence, if the defendant fails to appear and the plaintiff
amends his complaint, by inserting new and/or additional claims for
relief, a copy of the amended complaint must be served in the same
manner as the summons.
In a suit against a vendor of Florida real estate to obtain specific
performance of an agreement to sell property, the vendor defaulted after
having been served with process. The plaintiff, by leave of court, then
filed an amendment to the complaint showing that additional defendants
had filed pendente lite claims against the lands in controversy. Further
relief on that account was sought against the vendor. This subsequent
pleading, the amended complaint, was not served in accordance with
Rule 1.4(a). The appellate court held that the additional claims were
not properly in issue and should not have been included in the decree.82
The court opined that "when process is served upon a defendant, he
is thus brought into court to answer only the case made by preceding
pleadings." Adjudication of any other claim would be outside the issues
and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, if the defendant upon
whom process has been served decides to confess the complaint by failure
to plead, he has the right to assume that only the claim thus confessed
will be decided. If a different claim is decided, there is a lack of legal
due process.83
4. MODIFICATION OF THE STATUTORY PERIOD FOR THE COMMENCEMENT
OF AN ACTION
To determine whether the court or the parties have the power to
modify or waive the statutory time and notice requirements it is neces-
sary in each case to read carefully the applicable law. In Florida, provi-
sions in a contract limiting the time, within which the parties may bring
an action on the contract or pertaining to matters arising from it, to a
shorter period than the one provided by statute are void as against
public policy.84
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay8" is a case in point. Suit was
brought in a Florida court on an insurance policy with a one-year limi-
tation provision. The plaintiff obtained the policy while he resided in
Illinois and, thereafter, moved to Florida. Suit was brought under the
82. Colburn v. Highland Realty Co., 153 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
83. Id. at 736.
84. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1963).
85. 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961). See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 376 U.S. 179
(1964); Schluter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) ; Bayitch,
Conflict of Laws in Florida 1957-1963, 18 U. MiAmi L. Rav. 269, 273.
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policy more than a year after the cause of action had arisen. In response
to a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, concerning the applicability of Section 95.03 of the Florida
Statutes, the supreme court answered that the test is not whether the
agreement was executed in Florida, but whether an action on the contract
might have been maintained in a Florida state court. The statutory
period for bringing an action on a written contract not under seal is five
years."" Hence, the one-year limitation in the contract was void, and
the complaint was timely filed within the statutory period.
Although the running of the statutory period is generally treated as
an affirmative defense 7 that may be waived if not timely pleaded,88 the
wording of a particular statute may render the limitation jurisdictional.
Thus, it has been held 9 that the language of the statute requiring an
action challenging the validity of a tax assessment to be brought within
sixty days of the time the assessment became final is mandatory. Failure
to comply with its terms deprives the court of power to entertain the
action and subjects the complaint to dismissal. 90 The state comptroller
is an indispensible party to such proceedings.9' However, failure to join
him within the 60-day period is not jurisdictional, since the statute only
makes his presence a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action and
not to its institution. A complaint, timely filed, may thereafter be
amended to permit his joinder 92 after the period within which the com-
plaint could have been filed has expired.93 Misjoinder of parties is not
a ground for dismissal of the action . 4
E. Private Agreements or Consents
Florida courts do not recognize private agreements between the
parties or their counsel unless they have been reduced to writing, sub-
scribed by the party to be charged or his attorney, or unless they have
been made before the court and promptly incorporated into the record
or the stenographic notes of the proceedings. 5
Notwithstanding the plain provisions of the rule, and the caveat in
the last survey, local attorneys still disregard its express provisions to
their clients' prejudice.
Appellate courts have held private oral agreements regarding the
86. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1963).
87. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
88. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(h).
89. Henry v. County of Dade, 149 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
90. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b)(1).
91. FLA. STAT. § 196.14 (1963).
92. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(8).
93. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18. This rule analogous to FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
94. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18.
95. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.5(d).
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amount of alimony arrears,96 postponement of the time in which to file
an answer,9 7 and the possibility of a reduction of attorney's fees9 8 to be
ineffective to bind the court because they did not comply with the rule.
F. Extending Time
The courts may not enlarge the time for making a motion for a
directed verdict, for making a motion for a new trial, or for taking an
appeal. 9 In all other matters, the courts have a broad discretionary
power to grant time extensions.
The trial courts discretionary power is subject to appellate review
and to reversal on showing of an abuse. Lazow v. Lazow'01 involved a
suit to change a son's surname to his mother's maiden name. The de-
fendant father, who had been served constructively in New York where
he resided, appealed from a decree granting the petition and assigned
as error the denial of his request for a postponement of the hearing. The
district court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in that
six days' notice of the trial was insufficient under the facts presented.
G. Pleadings
1. PLEADINGS REQUIRED OR ALLOWED
The pleadings which are allowed are a complaint, an answer, a
reply if the answer contains a counterclaim denominated as such, and
an answer to a cross-claim.''
In Bergovey v. Atlantic Electric, Inc. °2 the plaintiff filed suit
grounded on fraud against corporations in which he was an officer, di-
rector and stockholder and against another individual who was also
an officer and director in the defendant corporations. In his complaint he
sought injunctive relief, the appointment of a receiver and an account-
ing. The defendant counterclaimed, and the plantiff replied. Thereafter,
the defendant, with the court's leave, 03 filed an amended counterclaim
in two counts, the second count of which was substantially identical
with the original counterclaim. The plaintiff did not file a reply to the
amended counterclaim, but he subsequently amended his complaint to
ask for the dissolution of the corporations. Without answering the
amended complaint and without notice to the plaintiff, the defendant
96. Morris v. Truax, 152 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
97. CIA, Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, C.A. v. U.S. and Overseas Corp., 144 So.2d 338 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1962).
98. Beck v. Humkey, 146 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.6.
100. 147 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
101. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a).
102. 140 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
103. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a).
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moved for a decree pro confesso. °4 on his counterclaim. After.ex parte
proceedings, the court entered the requested decree (also without notice
to the plaintiff) granting the relief that the defendant had sought in the
second count of his amended counterclaim. The plaintiff's subsequent
motion to vacate the decree °5 was denied, but, by a separate order, the
court continued the principal suit. On the plaintiff's appeal from the
adverse decree, two issues were before the district court: 1. When the
defendant has filed an amended counterclaim to which the plaintiff has
not replied, can the reply to the original counterclaim stand over as a
response to that portion of the amended counterclaim to which it is
responsive (as was the practice under Equity Rule 36, prior to the
adoption of the rules?'0 6); and, 2. Did the lower court abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to vacate the decree pro confesso?
The appellate court reversed on the basis of an abuse of judicial
discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate the decree. How-
ever, in dicta the court said that although a literal reading of Rule
1.15 (a)10 7 appeared to indicate that a responsive pleading to an amended
pleading was mandatory when otherwise required, the rule must be read
in the light of the avowed purpose of the rules "to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.' 0 8 Since the adoption
of the 1954 Rules in no way impairs the inherent discretionary power
of a chancellor and since he retains jurisdiction of a cause to review his
previously entered orders, a reply to an original counterclaim which is
responsive to an amended counterclaim should be sufficient to prevent
a default for failure to answer the amended counterclaim.
2. THE COMPLAINT
a. Methods of Attack
Under the rules, technical forms of seeking relief are abolished." 9
The function of the complaint is to inform the defendant of the nature
of the cause against him."0 It should contain a short and plain state-
ment of the ultimate facts"' on which the pleader relies and which are
104. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.9.
105. FLA. R. CIv. P. 3.10.
106. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a).
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a).
A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining
for response to the original pleading, or within 10 days after service of the amended
pleading, which ever is longer, unless the court otherwise orders. Ibid.
108. FLA. R. Civ. P. A.
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(a).
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
111. In Cushen v. Cushen, 143 So.2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), the defendant took an
interlocutory appeal from an order denying her motion to dismiss a petition for a change
of child custody on the ground that it did not allege the facts on which the charge was
based. In sustaining the order the court said at 536:
The rules of civil procedure were designed to simplify pleading. If we are to retain
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sufficient to state a cause of action." 2 If the complaint meets these re-
quirements, but is "so vague and ambiguous that a party cannot reason-
ably be required to frame a responsive pleading,""' the proper procedure
for attacking the complaint is by a motion for a more definite statement
and not by a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.114 An alternative way in which the defendant can obtain the
necessary factual information is by the employment of the discovery
devices provided for in the rules." 5 If, however, the complaint entirely
fails to state a claim (e.g., when no ultimate facts relating to an essential
element of the plaintiff's case have been alleged)' it will be subject
to a dismissal on the defendant's motion." 7 If one part of the complaint
is insufficient to state a claim for relief, the defective part can likewise
be stricken on motion." 8 However, a motion to strike is addressed to the
complained-of paragraphs in their entirety, and if any of the allegations
contained in said paragraphs are relevant, the motion to strike should
be denied." 9
The plaintiffs appealed from an order dismissing their complaint.
The district court found that, although the plaintiffs had not complied
with the procedural requirement of separate statements in numbered
paragraphs, 2 ° the allegations of fact were sufficient to state a claim for
relief on the theory either of a constructive trust or of estoppel by deed.
A mere violation of the formal requirements of Rule 1.8(f) was not suffi-
cient to sustain a motion to dismiss.' 21
b. Joinder of Inconsistent Causes of Action
The plaintiff brought suit to cancel a deed conveying real property
on the alternative grounds that the grantor was either incompetent or
in all their vigor, the distinctions between 'ultimate facts' and 'evidentiary facts,' we
will frustrate one of the purposes of the rules. The test is whether the complaint
(petition here) is sufficient to state a cause of action.
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b) ; Naples Builders Supply Co. v. Clutter Constr. Corp., 152
So.2d 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
113. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(e).
114. Ibid.; Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
115. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21, 1.22, 1.24, and 1.25 (Depositions), 1.27 (Interrogatories to
Parties), 1.28 (Production of Documents), 1.29 (Examination of Parties and Property), 1.30
(Admission of Facts and Genuiness of Documents). Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., supra
note 114.
116. Romans v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc., 155 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963);
Saks v. Smith, 145 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) ; Frisch v. Kelly, 137 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1962); Stern v. Perma-Stress, Inc., 134 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
117. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b)(6). In passing upon such motion, all well-pleaded ultimate
facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the facts are resolved in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. O'Neal v. Crumpton
Builders, Inc., 143 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) ; Leonard v. Browne, 134 So.2d 872 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1961).
118. Rudman v. Baine, 133 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
119. Lovi v. North Shore Bank, 137 So.2d 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
120. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(f).
121. Cook v. Katiba, 152 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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had acted under the grantee's undue influence. The defendant took an
interlocutory appeal from an order denying his motion to strike or dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that the counts were irreconcilable
and mutually exclusive. In upholding the lower court's order, the district
court 12 adverted to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 1.8(g):
"A party may... state as many separate claims 2 ' or defenses as he has,
regardless of consistency. . . . All pleadings shall be construed so as to
do substantial justice.' 24
c. Pleading Special Matters
Capacity: In the great majority of cases, the capacity of the party
to sue or be sued is not in dispute. Under our simplified rules of pleading,
it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to allege capacity in his complaint.
Rather, the defendant who wishes to challenge the capacity of a party
must raise the issue by a specific negative averment in his answer. 25
During the course of the trial, the defendant sought dismissal of
the proceedings because of the plaintiff's failure to comply with Florida's
"Fictitious Name Statute.!'1 26 The act provides that compliance with
its terms is a condition precedent to the right to maintain or defend any
action in Florida courts. On appeal from an adverse judgment, the de-
fendant assigned as error the denial of his motion. In affirming the lower
court, the district court held"' that the defendant had waived'28 the
right to assert the plaintiff's incapacity when he failed to call the court's
attention to such incapacity at a time no later than his answer. 2 '
Fraud: The rules' require that in all averments of fraud or mis-
take, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake be pleaded with
particularity.
The plaintiff corporation brought an action for conspiracy to de-
122. Mather-Smith v. Fairchild, 135 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). In analogizing toFederal Rule 8(e) (2), infra note 124, the court moved that the 1954 Florida rules are
patterned after the Federal rules, and insofar as is practicable, should be interpreted
consistently with them.
123. In Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Inv. Corp., 143 So.2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962),
the plaintiff sought, in separate counts, to recover his security deposit and damages on the
theory that he had been constructively evicted by the landlord's breach of his covenant tokeep the roof in repair. On the authority of the rules, the third district court affirmed the
lower court's order denying defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to elect which
remedy his action would proceed upon.
124. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(g). For cases interpreting analogous Fed. Rule 8(e) (2), See 2
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 8.32, at 1707 (2d ed. 1953).
125. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(a) ; Green v. Peters, 140 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
126. FLA. STAT. § 865.09 (1963).
127. Cor-Gal Builders v. Southard, 136 So.2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
128. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(h).
129. The concurring opinion reasoned that it should be permissible to call the court's
attention to a party's failure to comply with the statutory requirements not only at thepleading stage of the proceedings, but at any time prior to the entry of final judgment.
130. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(b).
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fraud and for gross negligence against its directors and officers and
against the administratrix of its deceased manager's estate. On the plain-
tiff's appeal from an order dismissing its third amended complaint, the
court affirmed the dismissal because it found that the requirement that
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake be pleaded with par-
ticularity applied where the complaint charged conspiracy to defraud.
Mere legal conclusions are fatally defective unless substantiated by
allegations of ultimate fact, and every fact essential to the cause of action
must be pleaded distinctly, definitely and clearly.' 3 '
Conditions Precedent: The plaintiff had brought an action on an
insurance policy and generally alleged compliance with all conditions
precedent.'32 The defendant's answer was a general denial of the allega-
tion of performance of conditions precedent and an averment of non-
cooperation as an affirmative defense. On the plaintiff's appeal from an
adverse judgment, held: reversed. The district court noted that Rule
1.9(c) requires a denial of the performance of conditions precedent to
be made specifically and with particularity. Apparently, when this has
been done, the plaintiff then has the burden of proving substantial com-
pliance, but when non-cooperation was averred generally as an affirma-
tive defense, the burden of proof rested with the defendant, who was not
entitled to a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case. 3
Special Damages: The requirement 34 that special damages must
be specifically stated must be read in pari materia with the provision
permitting amendment of the pleadings to conform with the evidence. 13 5
The defendant in a negligence action arising from an automobile
collision appealed from an adverse judgment and erroneously urged that
the court had erred in instructing the jury respecting an item of special
damages not raised in the pleadings, but concerning which testimony
had been heard without objection at the trial. The plaintiff amended
his complaint to conform to the evidence after a favorable verdict. The
district court sustained the jury instructions.'36 "When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings."'3 7
131. Ocala Loan Co. v. Smith, 155 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
132. FLA. R. Cwv. P. 1.9(c) provides:
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent it is sufficient
to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred,
a denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particu-
larity.
133. W. J. Kiely & Co. v. Bituminous Gas Corp., 145 So.2d 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
134. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(g).
135. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b).
136. Owca v. Zemzicki, 137 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
137. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b).
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3. DEFENSES
a. Raising Affirmative Defenses by Motion
Under Florida practice, affirmative defenses must be pleaded in the
answer and cannot be raised by motion practice.13  The statute of
frauds, 39 statute of limitations,'40 res judicata and estoppel by judg-
ment1 4' are affirmative defenses' and must be asserted in the answer.
In a suit for declaratory decree and other relief, involving an al-
leged oral promise to convey or bequeath real property in exchange for
specified personal services, the First District Court reversed a lower
court order dismissing the plaintiff's third amended complaint for non-
compliance with sections 725.011"a and 731.05 1'.. of the Florida Statutes
and remanded the cause with directions to permit the defendants a rea-
sonable time in which to answer and interpose such defenses as they
deemed advisable. 4 5
b. Waiver of Unpleaded Affirmative Defenses
An action was brought for specific performance of an oral agreement
to devise real property. The defense of the statute of frauds 14  was
raised for the first time on appeal. In affirming the decree ordering speci-
fic performance the court1 47 noted that under the rules,'14 "a party shall
138. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
139. Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); Cypen v. Frederick, 139
So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
140. Hawkins v. Bay County Publishers, Inc., 148 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
141. Sacks v. Rickles, 155 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
142. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
143. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1963) requires agreements for the conveyance of real estate
to be in writing.
144. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1963) provides that:
No agreement to make a will of real or personal property or to give a legacy or
make a devise shall be binding or enforceable unless such agreement is in writing
signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the person whose executor
or administrator is sought to be charged.
145. Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So.2d 759 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963). The case contained a
strong dissent which contended on the authority of federal case law interpreting FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(e) and 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 8.27, at 1841 (2d ed. 1951), that a distinction
should be made between those cases in which the requirement of a writing is a pre-requisite
to a right of action and those in which it is merely necessary to the enforcement of the
action. In the former case the writing is an essential element of plantiff's case, and the
absence of an appropriate allegation should subject the complaint to dismissal on defendant's
motion.
On such a motion under FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.11(b)(6), the dissent would imply inherent
judicial power to apply the interchangeability rule that is expressed in FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(b)
(6) and treat the motion as one for a summary judgment when matters outside the plead-
ings had been introduced and not objected to. Affirmative defenses may be asserted in
support of a motion for summary judgment even though no answer has been filed.
146. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1963). See supra note 129.
147. Cypen v. Frederick, 139 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
148. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.11(h), subject to the particular exceptions specified therein.
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be deemed to have waived all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion or in his answer.
The plaintiff had obtained a summary judgment in an action against
a surety on a promissory note. Subsequently, the court granted the de-
fendant's motion to stay execution upon the judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff had charged usurious interest concealed in the principal
amount of the note. On the plaintiff's appeal, the order was affirmed. 5'
A party is not precluded from asserting an affirmative defense of which
it had no knowledge at the time of the trial in support of a motion to
stay the execution of judgment, when to disallow the defense would be
tantamount to giving force and effect to an agreement that is violative of
public policy.151
c. Waiver of Defenses Not Raised by Motion
The defendant's former wife brought suit to obtain additional ali-
mony, exclusive use of the home and child custody. Constructive service
by publication was attempted to be made upon the husband. By motion 151
the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter (and improperly included grounds going to the merits)."' On
the defendant's interlocutory appeal, the court affirmed the order denying
the defendant's motion to dismiss, but it noted that had the motion
included an allegation of lack of jurisdiction over the defendant's per-
son, 154 the latter would have survived inclusion in the motion which con-
tained grounds relating to the merits. In the absence of such an allega-
gation, the court found that the defendant had waived the defense by
making a general appearance. 1 55
d. Waiver of Defenses by Inconsistent Action
In a suit to obtain specific performance of a contract to sell real
property, the vendor's Michigan receiver was found to have waived the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person when he voluntarily ap-
peared, applied for and obtained a stay of the performance and enforce-
ment of the decree pro confesso that had been entered against him.156
The defendant in an action arising from an automobile collision took
an interlocutory appeal 57 from an order denying her motion to dismiss
149. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) names seven defenses which may be asserted either by
motion or in answer at defendant's option.
150. Lambert v. Heaton, 134 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
151. FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1963) (criminal usury).
152. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b).
153. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b).
154. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b)(2).
155. St. Anne Airways, Inc. v. Webb, 142 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
156. Colburn v. Highland Realty Co., 153 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
157. FLA. App. R. 4.2.
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the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over her person. On her previous
motion to quash and dismiss the service of process because of defective
service, the court quashed the service of process, but refused to dismiss
the complaint. On the same day, the defendant had filed an independent
suit against the plaintiffs in the instant action based on the same oc-
currence. In affirmance of the lower court's order denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint, the district court held that the de-
fendant had submitted to the court's jurisdiction when she filed a com-
plaint against the plaintiffs in the instant suit. 5 '
It is submitted that had the defendant asserted the defenses of in-
sufficiency of service of process and lack of jurisdiction over the person
by answer, incorporating into the answer a compulsory counterclaim,
rather than by consecutive motions, the jurisdictional defense would
not have been waived by the inclusion of the counterclaim.'59 The holding
was predicated on a theory of waiver. 160 If the defendant had asserted
her alternative allegations simultaneously in her original motion, and the
court had deferred ruling on them,' 6' the jurisdictional defense would
not have been lost by the defendant's subsequent filing of an answer
including a compulsory counterclaim.
4. COUNTERCLAIMS
Rule 1.13(7) has been amended'62 to enable a defendant to state
as a cross-claim any claim "relating to any property that is the subject
matter of the original action." The rule is now substantially the same
as Federal Rule 13(g).113 The federal rule was primarily designed to
enable junior mortgagees, who had been made parties defendant in the
foreclosure suit of a senior mortgage, to litigate priority among them-
selves to the surplus proceeds, if any, of the foreclosure sale. 64 Assuming
that the Florida Supreme Court wished to accomplish the same result,
the amended rule has superseded prior Florida case law which had dis-
allowed junior mortgagees to settle prior rights among themselves.
5. NO THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN FLORIDA
Florida courts, unlike their federal counterparts do not recognize
third-party practice. 6 The defendant's attempted appeal was dismissed
when the record revealed that the interlocutory order sought to be ap-
158. Shurden v. Thomas, 134 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
159. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.13(2).
160. See notes 152-155 supra and accompanying text.
161. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(g); Jones v. Jones, 140 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
162. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 131 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1961).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
164. 1946 Committee Notes to FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 92-93
(2d ed. 1964).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
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pealed had dismissed his cross-claim that sought to join third-party
defendants in support of a claim that neither grew out of nor was ger-
maine to the plaintiff's action. 166
6. STRIKING SHAM, IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL PLEADINGS
The defendant in a mortgage foreclosure suit appealed from an
adverse summary decree entered pursuant to Rule 1.14, after the trial
court had granted the plaintiff's unverified motion to strike as sham
that portion of the defendant's answer denying that the plaintiff was the
holder of the note and mortgage sued upon. The district court reversed.
The plaintiff had neither complied with the express requirement of the
rule that "a motion to strike shall be sworn to and shall set forth fully
the facts on which the movant relies"'6 7 nor did the record reveal any
circumstances that might relieve the plaintiff from strict compliance
with the rule, such as an admission contained in a deposition of the
defendant or affirmative evidence tending to prove plaintiff's ownership
of the note and mortgage. 6"
A pleading may be considered sham when its falsity clearly
and indisputedly appears and it is evidently a mere pretense
set up in bad faith and without color of fact. It follows that
if there is, under the facts as established, an issue upon which
the pleading could be found good in part, it ought not to be
stricken in its entirety.6 9
The plaintiff brought an action for conversion of personal property,
claiming 5700 dollars in damages. In his deposition the plaintiff ad-
mitted that he had sold two-thirds of his interest in the property prior
to the date of the alleged conversion. After the complaint had been
stricken as sham, judgment for the defendant was reversed on ap-
peal. 7 on the ground that a substantially smaller claim could have been
filed in good faith and the cause transferred to a court with a lesser juris-
dictional limit.' 7 '
7. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
A party may amend a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required once as a matter of course before the responsive pleading has
been served. Thereafter, amendments are by written consent of the
adverse party or by leave of the court which shall be freely given when
justice so requires. 172 Thus, it was held to be an abuse of judicial dis-
166. Shotkin v. Deehl, 148 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
167. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.14(b).
168. Carapezza v. Pate, 143 So.2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
169. Sapienza v. Karland, Inc., 154 So.2d 204, 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
170. Ibid.
171. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39.
172. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a).
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cretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend before a responsive
pleading had been served. 3 However, it has been held not to be an
abuse of judicial discretion to limit the time within which an amendment
to the complaint may be made." 4 Rule 1.15 provides that the parties
may consent to amendments after the time for amendment has expired
"and there seems to be no reason why the parties cannot, by consent,
limit the time for amendment."7
Florida courts are committed to the view that leave to amend should
be freely given. Dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend was
held to be an abuse of discretion where the plaintiff had brought an
action for breach of contract and was denied permission to amend his
complaint to show that the named defendant was one and the same as
the other party to the agreement.'
On the same principle, the district court sustained an order per-
mitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint, summons and sheriff's return
to describe properly the defendant as being sued in his representative
and not in his individual capacity.' The suit challenged the validity of
the tax assessment and at the time the amendment was entered the
statutory period for instituting such an action had runY.8 The statute
made the comptroller a necessary party. The court noted that any per-
sons may at any time be made parties if their presence is necessary to
a complete determination of the cause.17' An amendment which merely
corrects the description of a party, and does not change the basic cause
of action, relates back to the date of the orignal pleading.'80
The plaintiff filed a complaint charging gross negligence. On a pre-
vious appeal 8' from an order dismissing the second count of the com-
plaint, the district court had held that the plaintiff need only prove or-
dinary negligence. The plaintiff did not amend his complaint, and the
defendant filed his answer of general denial. After the case came on for
trial and the jury had been impaneled, the plaintiff moved for leave
to remove the allegations of gross negligence from his complaint. The
defendant moved for a continuance. The court denied the plaintiff's
motion and at the close of his case granted the defendant's motion for
a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had not established
a prima facie case of gross negligence. On the plaintiff's appeal from the
173. Volpicella v. Volpicella, 136 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
174. Nenow v. Ceilings & Specialties, Inc., 151 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
175. Id. at 32. It is interesting to note that the limitation was by court order.
176. American Ladder & Scaffold Co. v. Miami Ventilated Awning Co., 150 So.2d 268
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
177. Green v. Peters, 140 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
178. FLA. STAT. § 192.21 (1963).
179. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.17(a).
180. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c).
181. Hale v. Adams, 117 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
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adverse judgment, it was held that the court had abused its discretion
in disallowing the amendment which was strictly in accord with the law
of the case established by the previous appeal. The determination made
on the previous appeal had resolved the issue of negligence, and the
defendant, therefore, was estopped from claiming insufficient notice of
the applicable law prior to trial.182
The court has discretionary power to permit the service of sup-
plemental pleading setting forth the transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the original pleading. In a divorce
proceeding, it was held that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in permitting the defendant to amend his counterclaim to include an alle-
gation of adultery reportedly committed four months subsequent to the
filing of the original counterclaim.18 3 The court noted that the amended
counterclaim sought only the same relief as the original counterclaim,
but on an additional ground, and that unless the additional claim were
allowed, the defendant would have been deprived of a forum in which
to litigate the issue of his wife's adultery.'
H. Parties
1. NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
In a suit for the reduction of the annual ad valorem tax assessment,
the defendants took an interlocutory appeal from an order denying their
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join the state comptroller,
who had been made a necessary and indispensable party by statute,8 3
and from an order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to join the comptroller within the time for filing suit.'86 The plain-
tiff corporation had been permitted to amend its complaint to join the
comptroller, but the 60-day statutory period for bringing the action had
already lapsed. In affirming the lower court, the district court held that
joinder of the comptroller was not jurisdictional. The original com-
plaint had been timely filed and the act only provided that a suit could
not be maintained unless the comptroller had been made a party. This
means that an action may be instituted, but that it may not be carried
to completion without his joinder. The reason for making the comptroller
an indispensable party was to allow him an opportunity to present his
views on the probable effect of the decree upon state revenues. For this
purpose, his joinder was timely.187
The divorced wife of the defendants' grantor brought suit to set
182. Hale v. Adams, 138 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
183. The court treated the amended counterclaim as a supplemental pleading.
184. Scherer v. Scherer, 150 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
185. FLA. STAT. § 196.14 (1963).
186. FLA. STAT. § 192.21 (1963).
187. McNayr v. Cranbrook Invs., Inc., 146 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real property reportedly
made while the grantor was in arrears with his obligations under a di-
vorce decree. The plaintiff's husband, the grantor, had no notice of
the hearing and did not appear. On appeal from an order setting aside
the conveyance, the defendants urged as error the failure to join their
grantor as a party defendant. In affirming the order, the court noted
that in Florida the debtor-grantor is not an indispensable party in a
suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. The record indicated that
the defendants in the instant suit would have been unable to maintain
an action against the plaintiff's former husband since the conveyance
of the property to them had been either a gift or had been made for a
grossly inadequate consideration. 188
The rules 89 provide that "any person may be made a defendant
who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff." The defendant
appealed from an amended summary decree for the plaintiffs in a suit
to enforce a settlement agreement, and the district court held that the
trial court had correctly decided to retain jurisdiction over an individual
defendant who was no longer an officer of the corporate defendant when
it was found that she had a claim or interest adverse to the plaintiff.'90
2. MISJOINDER OF PARTIES
The plaintiffs gave perjured testimoy regarding their marital status
in an action for damages arising from an automobile accident. The trial
court dismissed the complaint of both plaintiffs with prejudice. The dis-
trict court reversed because the court lacked power to dismiss the com-
plaint prior to an adjudication on the merits.'' Misjoinder of parties is
not a ground for dismissal under the rules.9
3. DROPPING PARTIES
An action was brought for damages arsing from a coincident 4-car
collision. Two of the defendants answered, counter-claimed and cross-
claimed. At the pre-trial conference,93 the plaintiff was erroneously
permitted to non suit the counterclaiming defendants, and they to non-
suit him. The remaining claims were severed 94 for purposes of trial.
On an appeal from one of the noncounterclaiming defendants it was
urged as error that the dismissal of the complaint and of the counter-
188. Frell v. Frell, 154 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
189. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.17(a).
190. Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Special Invs., Inc., 154 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
191. Parham v. Kohler, 134 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
192. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18; Deauville Operating Corp. v. Town & Beach Plumbing Co.,
137 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
193. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16.
194. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.20(b).
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claim as to some of the defendants were invalid partial dismissals.' 95 In
affirming' 96 the lower court's action, it was noted that a motion for a
nonsuit cannot properly be granted before trial.'97 The action was not
joint and was, therefore, not an invalid partial dismissal under Rule 1.35,
which would entirely divest the court of jurisdiction. Rather the motion
should have been treated as one to drop some of the parties. As pre-
viously noted,"9 ' misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissal of an
action.
I. Dismissal of Actions
1. ATTEMPTED ABONDONMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The plaintiff appealed from an order dismissing its complaint with
prejudice.' 99 On a previous appeal of the same case, judgment and ver-
dict for the plaintiff had been sustained on the issue of liability and the
cause remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiff
thereafter filed a new complaint in the same action which resulted in
the above mentioned order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. By
analogy to the cases that refuse to allow amendment of the pleadings
to set up a new cause of action and to set up a different basis of relief
after appellate mandate, the court held that a party may not abandon
the cause thus litigated and proceed in a new complaint upon the same
catise of action after the ruling of a district court has been returned.
20 0
2. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL-INTERCHANGEABILITY WITH A MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
The Florida rules,"0' unlike their federal counterparts,0 2 provide
that "[a] fter the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." No dis-
tinction is made between jury and nonjury actions.0 3 Therefore, under
the rules as presently written, the defendant in a jury action may move
either for an involuntary dismissal or for a directed verdict.0 4
195. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.35(a) (2).
196. Ruis v. Halloway, 139 So.2d 745 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
197. Welgoss v. End, 112 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
198. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
199. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b).
200. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Florida Transp. Co., 154 So.2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
201. FiA. R. Crv. P. 1.35(b).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
203. In 1963, Federal Rule 41(b) was amended to provide that "[aifter the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." (Emphasis added.)
204. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7. In McKee v. Fairmont Homes, Inc., 155 So.2d 733 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1963), the court affirmed an order granting the defendant's motion for an involuntary
dismissal made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in a trial by jury.
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3. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
A 1962 addition to Rule 1.35(b) permits the defendant to move
for dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute.0 5 As in the
case of dismissal for failure to prosecute under the statute, 0 6 a similar
dismissal under the rule should be without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided. 0 7 The federal position is contrary.0 8
The defendants in a negligence action sought to require the plain-
tiff to deliver a copy of the physician's report of his alleged injuries to
the defendants' attorney. The following month, the court granted the
plaintiff's request for a continuance. More than a year later, the plain-
tiff redocketed the case for trial and gave the defendants notice of the
hearing date for the hearing on their motion for the production of the
physician's report. Thereafter, the court granted the defendant's sub-
sequent motion to dismiss the cause for lack of prosecution.20 9 In re-
versing, the district court reiterated that the statute "is not self-executing,
but requires the moving party to seek dismissal before any affirmative
action in the prosecution of the cause is taken subsequent to the required
period for abatement °210
What constitutes "good cause" depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case. Reinstatement of an action has been denied when
the prosecuting attorney left the law firm shortly after the action had
ended in a mistrial and the plaintiff asserted that he had erroneously be-
lieved that the court would redocket the case sua sponte.21' The dissolu-
tion of a legal partnership (eleven months prior to the petition for re-
instatement of the action) was held not sufficient good cause to justify
the lower court's order granting reinstatement.1 2 The court in the
same case intimated that settlement negotiations would not satisfy the
statutory requirement.
4. REINSTATEMENT OF DISMISSED ACTIONS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN
An action dismissed pursuant to section 45.19 of the Florida Statutes
may be reinstated for good cause shown on motion by any party in
interest made within one month after such order of dismissal. Although
there is no similar express provision in the rules, it would logically seem
to follow that the court could in the exercise of its inherent discretionary
205. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962).
206. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1963) ; Sacks v. Rickles, 155 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963);
Shew v. Kirby, 135 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
207. Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 276 (1963).
208. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 41.11[2], at 1059 (2d ed. 1951).
209. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1963).
210. Pollack v. Pollack, 110 So.2d 474, 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
211. Schumaker v. Orange State Oil Co., 141 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
212. Fort Walton Lumber & Supply Co. v. Parish, 142 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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power reinstate a complaint so dismissed under circumstances similar
to those in which statutory reinstatement would be appropriate.
Three days prior to trial the plaintiff obtained a continuance and
the court ordered payment of costs as a condition precedent to re-
docketing the case. The action was subsequently dismissed for failure
to prosecute. Later, the plaintiff attempted to have the complaint rein-
stated and alleged, as the reason for his delay, the reported representa-
tion of the defendant's attorney to the effect that there might be a re-
duction in the assessed costs. The district court affirmed the trial court's
order finding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate sufficient good
cause for reinstatement of his complaint.21
5. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF FACTS-RES JUDICATA
The plaintiff instituted an action for breach of an implied warranty
of fitness. The trial court granted the plaintiff fifteen days in which to
amend his complaint. It is unclear from the opinion whether the plaintiff
availed himself of this opportunity. Thereafter, in response to the de-
fendant's motion,14 the trial court dismissed the complaint with preju-
dice. In affirming the dismissal on appeal, it was held that the 1962
amendments 215 to Rule 1.35(b) 216 required the court expressly to over-
rule its prior decision in Hammac v. Windham21 and to advert to the
position of the Florida Supreme Court as expressed in Kautzmann v.
James218 prior to the adoption of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Under the Kautzmann view, the determination of whether or not
the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action operates
as an adjudication upon the merits (i.e., is a dismissal with prejudice)
depends upon the basis of the dismissal. If the dismissal is predicated
upon the failure of the complaint to allege certain essential facts, which
could be cured by amendment, the dismissal does not operate as an
adjudication on the merits. However, when no legal right of recovery
exists under any view of the facts as stated, dismissal of the complaint
bars subsequent litigation on the same cause of action. The court then
found that under the circumstances in the instant case the plaintiff had
entirely failed to state a legal right to recovery. The Restatement of
Judgments is in accord with this position.2 1 9
213. Beck v. Humpkey, 146 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
214. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) (6).
215. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 205.
216. Prior to this amendment, Rule 1.35(b) provided that unless the court in its order
of dismissal otherwise specified, "any dismissal not provided in this rule" shall operate as
an adjudication upon the merits. The quoted words were deleted in the amended rule.
217. 119 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 122 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1960) ; 16 U. Mscrr
L. REv. 621 (1962). That case held that the subsequently-deleted provision in Rule 1.35(b)
required any dismissal under Rule 1.11(b)(6) to operate as an adjudication on the merits
unless the order provided otherwise.
218. 66 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1953).
219. RESTATEMENT, JUIDGMENTS § 50 (1942).
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6. STATUS OF THE NONSUIT
"The history of recent years has been that of a continuing limitation
upon the nonsuit as known to the common law. '220 It has been held
that dismissal of an action prior to trial is governed by the rules, 2 ' and
that, in the absence of a written stipulation signed by all of the parties,
the plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss his suit disappears once an ad-
verse party has served his answer or a motion for summary judgment
whichever occurs first.222 Thereafter, the plaintiff may dismiss his action
only with leave of court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper.2
21
In Johns v. Puca2 4 the plaintiff in a negligence action took a non-
suit when a court announced, at the close of the plaintiff's case, that it
intended to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and it
moved to dismiss the defendant's compulsory counterclaim. The de-
fendant appealed from an order granting the plaintiff's motion. In re-
versing the order appealed from, the appellate court held that the trial
court should have permitted the trial to continue as to the counterclaim
because the litigant ought not to be able to control the progress of a
claim against him solely because of his speed in a race to the courthouse.
Of course, the practical effect of this decision is to foreclose a plaintiff
from taking a nonsuit in an action in which a compulsory counterclaim
has been filed since each party's claim is a compulsory counterclaim with
respect to the other. The rules require compulsory counterclaims to be
prosecuted simultaneously or to be lost forever.225
In 1962, Rule 1.35 was amended.226 Among the changes made to
the second section of the rule dealing with involuntary dismissals was
the deletion of language relating to the plaintiff's statutory right to a
nonsuit.221
Subsequently, and beyond the intended coverage of this Survey,
the First District Court decided that in Florida, a plaintiff no longer
has an absolute right to a nonsuit once an adverse party has either
answered or moved for a summary judgment. 228 The plaintiffs had in-
stituted a negligence action. More than a year later, after extensive dis-
220. Johns v. Puca, 143 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
221. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35.
222. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a) (1); Roberts v. Roberts, 133 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
223. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.35(a) (2); Conner v. Wagner, 135 So.2d 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961);
Welgoss v. End, 112 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
224. 143 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
225. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1).
226. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129, (Fla. 1962) ; Barns & Mattis,
1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. MiAmI L. REV. 276, 287
(1963).
227. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963).
228. Dobson v. Crews, 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), affirmed, Crews v. Dobson,
Case No. 33, 566 (Fla. July 1, 1965).
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covery and pre-trial preparation, the cause came on for trial. When the
jury had been impaneled and sworn, the plaintiffs moved for a nonsuit.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.229 The
defendant's motion was denied and the court announced that the plain-
tiffs had taken a nonsuit and that it would enter a judgment for ap-
propriate costs against them; it then dismissed the jury.
On appeal, the defendant assigned as error the action of the lower
court allowing the plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit, which did not
operate as an adjudication on the merits, and the denial of his own
motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
The district court reversed the decision below and said that in
reaching its conclusion it was unnecessary to analyze the effect of the
omitted language under the 1962 revision of 1.35(b), 230 because that
language, by its inclusion in the section relating to involuntary dismissals,
had referred only to the plaintiff's right to take an involuntary nonsuit
to preclude the entry of an adverse ruling. In deciding that the plain-
tiff's right to a voluntary nonsuit had been superseded by the rules, the
court adverted to the constitutional provision 231 relegating the regulation
of judicial practice and procedure to the supreme court and to section
25.371 of the Florida Statutes which repeals and abrogates existing pro-
cedural statutes to the extent that they conflict with rules promulgated
by the supreme court. 3 2 It found that the continued existence of the right
contravened the underlying purpose of Rule 1.35 (a) to limit the plain-
tiff's absolute right to discontinue his action to the very short period
between the filing of the complaint and the service of an answer or a
motion for summary judgment, whichever is shorter. The object of the
rules is "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."1 3 It best comports with this purpose to allow the plaintiff
only a very brief period of unrestrained control over the litigation. Once
the expenses of preparation for trial have begun to mount and the in-
terests of the other parties may be adversely affected, a dismissal should
be permitted only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and then
only upon such terms and conditions as the court deems just.234 Ob-
viously, to enable a plaintiff to pick up his hat and to abandon his cause
when it has finally come to trial, after the other litigants have spent long
months in preparation and, in all probability, incurred considerable
229. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.35(b).
230. Supra note 216 and accompanying text.
231. FLA. CO NST. art. V, § 3.
232. See also In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 205 at 129: "All rules,
parts of rules, statutes, or parts of statutes, inconsistent with the amendments hereby ap-
proved and adopted are hereby repealed."
233. FLA. R. Civ. P. A.
234. This position has been adopted by the federal courts in interpreting analogous
Federal Rule 41(a).
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expense, defeats the purpose of the rule and well may work the very
injustice the rule was designed to prevent.
In the instant case, the court found that the cause was still pending
when the defendant's motion was made because the plaintiff's action was
ineffective to terminate the trial and that, under the circumstances in
the case, the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. It is submitted
that the district court erroneously found that an involuntary dismissal
for failure to prosecute under Rule 1.35(b) would be a dismissal with
prejudice, unless otherwise specified."' 5 The amended rule286 is stated in
three paragraphs. The defendant's motion came within the purview of
the first paragraph. 3 7 The second paragraph provides for an involuntary
dismissal where the plaintiff has failed to state a legally sufficient claim
to relief, and the third paragraph provides that an order of involuntary
dismissal "under the foregoing [2d] paragraph," with certain exceptions,
not here relevant, shall operate as an adjudication on the merits unless
otherwise specified. Interpreting the language in the third paragraph in its
plain and usual meaning, ordinarily involuntary dismissals granted pur-
suant to the provisions in the second paragraph are automatically with
prejudice, unless expressly otherwise. Conversely, involuntary dismissals
based on failure to prosecute, as permitted by the first paragraph are
generally without prejudice unless the order of dismissal otherwise speci-
fies. If one adopts this interpretation of the rule, there is then no reason
to distinguish the area in which the rule permits a defendant to move for
dismissal under the rule from that in which a similar dismissal may be
had under the statute2 8 -the results are the same in either case.23  Of
course, an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is discretionary and
may be with prejudice if the facts so warrant.
7. FORMER ADJUDICATION
The plaintiff in a negligence action to recover damages for personal
injuries received in an automobile collision appealed from an adverse
summary judgment. He had previously settled with his insurance com-
pany for damages to his car and assigned his right of action for property
damage to the insurer. The insurance company sued the defendant for
these damages and about a month later the plaintiff brought the instant
action. The insurer's complaint was dismissed with prejudice and this
dismissal was asserted in the defendant's answer to the complaint in the
235. Dobson v. Crews, 164 So.2d 252, 259 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964), affirmed Case No. 33,
566 (Fla. June 7, 1965).
236. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.35(b).
237. "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ...a defendant may move for dismissal
of an action or of any claim against him." FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.35(b).
238. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1963).
239. Statutory dismissal for failure to prosecute is without prejudice. Yinger v. Kasow,
123 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
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personal injury action. The answer also asserted that only a single cause
of action arose from the defendant's alleged tortious act resulting in both
personal and property damage and that the plaintiff's action violated the
rule against splitting a cause of action. The district court reversed the
lower court and predicated its decision24 on the ground that either (a)
there was no splitting of a cause of action or (b) even if -there were, the
defendant had waived the defense by waiting until the first action had
been dismissed before attempting to assert it. The defendant sought
certiorari to review this decision. On rehearing of the petition for certio-
rari, the supreme court affirmed the result, but rejected the rationale of
the district court; rather, it based its decision on the economic realities
by which many plaintiffs whose family cars have been damaged in a
collision are practically compelled to negotiate with their insurers for
the repair of their automobiles before the extent of their personal injuries
has been fully determined. 4'
In recognizing the subrogation exception to the rule against splitting
a cause of action, it receded from its former position in Mims v. Reid. 42
J. Depositions and Discovery
1. NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS
The defendant in a negligence action for damages arising from an
automobile collision took the deposition of the plaintiff's physician after
due notice. When the defendant attempted to introduce the deposition
into evidence at the trial pursuant to section 90.23(2) of the Florida
Statutes,24 the plaintiff objected and his objections were sustained. On
the defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment, the trial court's order
was upheld. 44 The statutory notice required for taking the deposition
of an expert witness must state the reasons therefor,2 45 because objection
240. Scott v. Rosenthal, 132 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
241. Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963).
242. 98 So.2d 498 (Fla, 1957).
243. FLA. STAT. § 90.23(2) (1963). "The testimony of any expert or skilled witness may
be taken at any time before the trial of any civil cause . . . upon reasonable notice in the
manner now provided for taking depositions de bene esse. . . ." Ibid.
244. Owca v. Zemzicki, 137 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
245. FLA. STAT. § 90.23(2). Notice for taking depositions de bene esse required that the
reasons be stated. These have since been abolished, See In re Amendments to Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure, 131 So.2d 475, 476 (Fla. 1961). In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedures,
139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962), provided that amended rule 1.32(2) has superseded FLA.
STAT. § 90.23 (2). The amendment states that "the testimony of any expert or skilled wit-
ness may be taken at any time before the trial of any civil cause . . . in the manner now
provided for taking depositions under Rule 1.21 or 1.22." Under Rule 1.22(a) (1) the rea-
sons for taking the deposition must be stated in the petition for permission to take the
deposition before action or pending appeal and a copy of the petition must be served with
the notice. Under Rule 1.21(a), the reasons are not an essential element of the notice. See
Vecsey v. Vecsey, 115 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959). Query: Is a statement of the reasons
for taking the deposition still an essential element of the notice for taking the deposition of
an expert witness? Rule 1.32 requires that objections to the trial use of the testimony be
made before the deposition is taken,
1964]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
to the trial use of the expert testimony so taken must be made before
the deposition has been taken. 246 However, when a deposition is taken
under the rules while an action is pending,247 the adverse party need not
object to its admissability until it is offered at the trial. 48
2. USE OF DEPOSITIONS
In order to require a public improvements contractor to reimburse
the city for a payment received pursuant to an allegedly ultra vires agree-
ment, the defendant in a taxpayer's suit appealed from an adverse judg-
ment. The question in the district court was whether the plaintiff had
adequately established his necessary status as a taxpayer, which was
a prerequisite to the maintenance of the class action. The trial court
had found that he was necessarily a taxpayer as a citizen of the mu-
nicipality. The district court affirmed the decree but predicated its deci-
sion on uncontroverted testimony in the plaintiff's deposition that he
owned homestead property which was assessed for more than the consti-
tutionally exempt amount, and he, therefore, must be an ad valorem
taxpayer. The record apparently did not indicate whether the deposition
had been introduced into evidence at the trial, but it had been considered
by the chancellor without objection at a hearing on a motion for a sum-
mary decree which had been denied. The defendant's petition for a re-
hearing was denied,249 but the supreme court granted certiorari.25 ° In
reversing the First District Court, it was held that Rule 1.36(c) does
not have the effect of placing depositions, considered on a motion for
summary judgment, in evidence for all purposes in the trial, but that
to be considered as evidence in other stages of the action, they must be
introduced as provided in the rules.25'
"The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking
the depositon was an officer, director or managing agent of a public or
private corporation, partnership or association which is a party may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose.2 6 2 The use of such a depo-
sition, unlike the use of the deposition of a witness,258 is not conditioned
upon the non-availability of a deponent. 254
When the defendant relied on the deceased plaintiff's deposition
in support of his motion for a summary judgment, which was denied, he
246. FLA. STAT. § 90.23(2) (1963); FA. R. Civ. P. 1.32.
247. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21.
248. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(f).
249. R. L. Bernardo & Sons, Inc. v. Duncan, 134 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
250. R. L. Bernardo & Sons, Inc. v. Duncan, 145 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1962).
251. FA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(d).
252. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.21(d) (2).
253. Weber v. Berry, 133 So.2d 327 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). The use of a witness' deposi-
tion is controlled by the provisions of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(d)(3).
254. Dickson v. Feiner's Organization, Inc., 155 So.2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Mon-
salvatge & Co. v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 151 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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was held255 to have waived the provisions of the dead man's statute258
at the final hearing in the suit.
The plaintiff appealed from an adverse summary judgment in an
action to recover damages for breach of warranty and assigned as error
the admission of a deposition which he had given in a concurrently pend-
ing independent action. The plaintiff had not submitted any affidavits
or depositions in opposition to the defendant's motion. In reversing the
summary judgment the court said that a depositon given in one action
does not, in the absence of and admission, exhaust the facts upon which
the plaintiff relied in an independent action. The plaintiff was not required
to submit proofs countering those of the defendant until the defendant
had first established a prima facie case.2 57
3. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY-LIMITATIONS ON THE "WORK PRODUCT" CONCEPT
The defendant in a negligence action sought certiorari to review a
discovery order directing its general manager to answer a question re-
quiring him to report a conversation that transpired between the man-
ager and an employee after the plaintiff's accident. Certiorari was de-
nied25 when the only part of the conversation included in the manager's
report to the defendant was the employee's name and address. The
conversation was not entitled to the protection accorded to "work
products."
The defendant sought certiorari to review a discovery order quash-
ing the defendant's notice of taking the deposition of the plaintiff's
expert witness. The plaintiff had listed the expert as a prospective wit-
ness pursuant to a pre-trial order.25 In granting certiorari, the district
court said (a) that discovery could be had in areas not within the work
product limitation, and (b) that, although the work product privilege
is not waived by listing the expert as a prospective witness, once the
plaintiff relies on the expert's work product, the privilege no longer ap-
plies, and discovery may then be had of all relevant and otherwise un-
privileged matters. 260
Although the courts generally find that the reports and records
of attorneys261 and other experts262 are, in the absence of a showing of
compelling necessity, immune from discovery under the Hickman v.
255. Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
256. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1963).
257. Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
258. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Belcher, 144 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
259. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16.
260. Dade County v. Bosch, 133 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
261. Spector v. Alter, 138 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
262. Shawmut Van Lines, Inc. v. Small, 148 So.2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) (insurance
adjuster); Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415 v. William Weitz, Inc., 141 So.2d 18
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (bus agent).
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Taylor2 ' doctrine, the experts themselves are subject to discovery on
relevant, unprivileged matters.
In Shell v. State Road Department64 the Florida Supreme Court
recognized the right of the condemnee in eminent domain proceedings
to compel the production of surveys, appraisals and related matter which
reflect the valuation of the defendant's land, thereby placing an addi-
tional limitation on the definition of a "work product."
4. DEPOSITIONS-ASSESSMENT OF COSTS
Allowing the expense of depositions as taxable costs in a civil
action rests in the sound discretion of the trial court .... [T]he
courts are committed to the proposition that the proper ad-
ministration of justice requires that costs of litigation be kept
within reasonable bounds ... ."'
A court may refuse to assess the cost of depositions used at the trial
against the losing party if it feels that the same facts could have been
adduced by the less expensive method of affidavits and interrogatories. 210
It may, on the other hand, sustain an order assessing costs even though
the discovery order is subsequently modified.267 Generally, the cost of
depositions used only for discovery purposes, and not employed on final
hearing, will not be taxed against the opposing party.268
5. MOTION TO PRODUCE-FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN
Although the rules expressly provide that the proper device by which
to obtain the production of documents and other materials for inspection
or copying is, in the case of a party, by motion to the court showing
good cause,2 69 or, in the case of a witness, by subpoena duces tecum, 2 7°
local practitioners still attempt to require such production by erroneously
demanding it in the notice of a taking of a deposition.271
6. FAILURE TO ATTEND THE TAKING OF A DEPOSITION OF WHICH NOTICE
HAS BEEN RECEIVED
In an action to enforce an arbitration award, the plaintiff-union had
been granted a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, but
263. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
264. 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961); for a digest of the significant facts and analysis of the
holding, see Massey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 591, 624-25 (1962).
265. Travis v. Blackmon, 155 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). See FLA. STAT.
§ 58.13 (1963).
266. Travis v. Blackmon, supra note 265.
267. Shamut Van Lines, Inc. v. Small, supra note 262.
268. Crane v. Stulz, 136 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
269. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
270. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.34(b).
271. McKinley & Co. v. Arpine, 143 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Metz v. Smith,
141 So.2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415 v. William
Weitz, Inc., 141 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) ; Olin's Rent-a-Car System, Inc. v. Avis Rental
Car System Inc., 135 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the court had reserved jurisdiction for a trial to determine the amount
due. The defendant gave notice to the plaintiff of the taking of itg bugi-
ness agent's deposition and improperly 22 requested him to bring the plain-
tiff's membership records. The court denied the plaintiff's motion 7' to
quash the notice of the taking of the deposition on the ground that the
testimony and records sought were privileged. When the business agent
wilfully failed to appear at the deposition hearing on the appointed day,
the court, after notice and hearing, entered an order granting the de-
fendant's motion to vacate the partial summary judgment. On appeal,",
the order was sustained on the authority of Rule 1.31(d).275
K. Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment
1. JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON THE PLEADINGS
A motion for judgment or decree on the pleadings is proper after
the pleadings are closed and within such time as not to delay the trial.27
The pleadings are closed when the answer has been filed if it does not
contain a counterclaim or a cross-claim unless the court has ordered a
reply to an answer. If a counterclaim or a cross-claim has been filed,
there must be a reply or an answer respectively.277
A judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiff is proper only when
the answer is legally insufficient to preclude the plaintiff from recovering,
even though all of its allegations are true, and provable. For the de-
fendant, judgment. on the pleadings is proper only when the complaint is
legally insufficient to state a cause of action.
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party
admits for the purpose of the motion, the facts well pleaded by
his adversary, despite their denial in the movant's pleadings;
272. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 134(b) and §§ 5 immediately preceding 1.34(b). The propriety
of the notice was not in issue on the appeal.
273. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.24(b).
274. Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415 v. William Weitz, Inc., 141 So.2d 18
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
275. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear
before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, . . . the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of
any pleading of that party or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof
or enter a judgment by default against that party. FLA. R. Civ. P. 131(d).
Repeated failure of the plaintiff's father to appear at the time noticed for the taking
of his deposition resulted in dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. The district
court sustained the dismissal, but held that the record failed to support the "with prejudice"
portion of the order. Thornton v. Board of County Comm'rs, 149 So.2d 393 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963). Default judgment was entered upon defendants' failure to attend and submit them-
selves to the taking of depositions after being duly served with notice. On appeal, the default
was affirmed, but the cause was remanded for further proof and for reassessment of plain-
tiff's damages..
276. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(c).
277. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a); Riverside Bank v. Florida Dealers & Growers Bank, 151
So.2d 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
278. Morris v. Truax, 152 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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and the movant also admits the untruth of his own allegations
which have been denied by his adversary . . " Averments
in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required are
taken as denied. s8
The district courts again noted"' that the Florida rule on judgment on
the pleadings, unlike its federal counterpart,282 does not provide for the
interchangeability of that motion with one for a summary judgment.
Therefore, the court may not consider matters outside of the pleadings in
deciding whether to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a. Introduction
Notwithstanding the cautionary language in the reported opinions
suggesting judicial restraint in granting motions for summary judg-
ment,2 3 the device continues to be the one most frequently used for
terminating litigation. During the survey period, more than 193 of the
cases disposed of in this manner were appealed.28 4 Approximately 43 per
cent of these decisions were reversed.
The question properly determined on motion for summary judg-
ment is whether or not there exist in the cause genuine issues of
material fact. While the court may be convinced that a plaintiff
will have insurmountable difficulties in proving his case, it
should not by summary judgment prevent him from attempting
to do so .... 5
279. Greater Miami Tel. Answering Serv. v. A-1 Answering Serv., 141 So.2d 619 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1962).
280. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(e).
281. Morris v. Truax, supra note 278; Greater Miami Tel Answering Serv. v. A-1 An-
swering Serv., supra note 279.
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c), 28 U.S.C. following § 723(e) (1958).
283. See, e.g., Forston v. Atlantic Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., 143 So.2d 364, 368 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1962):
[T]he privilege of moving for summary judgment was not intended as a broad
alternative method of trying cases; and yet the decisions are replete with reversals
where this procedure was indiscriminately employed. Such resorts to summary pro-
cedure tend to retard rather than to promote the administration of justice.
In Goodman v. Strassburg, 139 So.2d 163, 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), the court noted
in reversing a summary judgment for the plaintiff, "[G]enerally, summary judgments are
not favored in actions bottomed upon charges of fraud, as the determination of this conduct
is generally within the province of the trier of facts."
In Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Edgerly, 155 So.2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), it was said
that the principle of restraint in granting motions for summary decrees, applies equally to
actions at law and suits in equity.
The difference between the chancellor's authority to enter summary decrees and his
authority to enter final decrees on the merits must be observed in the administra-
tion of justice.
284. Sixty-eight appeals were from summary judgments granted in negligence actions;
the remaining one hundred twenty-five appeals covered summary judgments and decrees in
miscellaneous suits. The percentage of reversal in the first group was 42.6%; in the second
group it was 42.4%.
285. Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 So.2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A summary judgment may properly be granted only when there
are no genuine issues of material fact, and the only question is one of
law.
b. Timeliness
A claimant may move for a summary judgment or decree at any
time after the expiration of twenty days from the commencement of
the action or after the adverse party has moved for a summary judg-
ment or decree whichever occurs first.2 86 Since the filing of one of the
defenses enumerated in Rule 1.11 (b) tolls the time for filing an answer,28 7
a motion for summary judgment may be made before the defendant has
answered.2 88 "[A] trial court should not grant a motion for summary
decree filed before the defendant has answered, unless it is clear that
an issue of material fact cannot be presented." '2 89 A court has inherent
power over its docket and a motion for a summary judgment of decree
may be granted while a Rule 1.11(b) motion is pending and, as yet,
undisposed.2 9 ° Such a motion may or may not be accompanied by sup-
porting affidavits.29 ' When the motion is made after the pleadings are
closed and is without supporting affidavits, etc., it has been held to serve
the same office as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.292
.c. The Motion and Proceedings Thereon
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs
appealed from an adverse summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion
to amend their complaint was granted and the amended complaint filed
on the day preceeding the date set for the hearing on the defendant's
motion for a summary judgment. In reversing the trial court, the ap-
pellate court held that the original complaint was deemed abandoned
when the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, complete in itself. The
rules require that the motion be served at least 10 days prior to the
scheduled hearing.29 In the instant case the decision at the hearing was
necessarily based on the amended complaint, and the 10-day notice re-
286. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a).
287. FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.11(a).
288. Florida Dairy Farmers Fed'n v. Borden Co., 155 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963);
Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) ; Edgewater Drugs, Inc. v. Jax Drugs,
Inc., 138 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a) is identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In the Edgewater Drugs
case, supra note 288 at 529, the court noted that the federal rule had been amended prior
to the adoption of the Florida rules to permit a motion for a summary judgment to be
filed prior to the filing of an answer. In literally adopting the federal rule, it should be
assumed that the Florida Supreme Court wished to achieve the same result.
289. A. & G. Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. Drake, 143 So.2d 703, 704 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
290. Evin R. Welch & Co. v. Mannheimer, 147 So.2d 185 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
291. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a).
292. Levin v. Fisher, 150 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
293. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.36(c).
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quirement was necessarily violated.294 Three proper procedural choices
were available to the trial court. It might have:
(1) postponed the hearing to meet the notice requirement of
Rule 1.36(c) ;
(2) denied the motion and set the matter for trial on the merits; or
(3) entered a partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1.36(d)
on the conceded issue of ownership, saving the other issue of negligence
for later disposition.
The judgment or decree sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment or a decree as a matter of law. 95 (Emphasis added.)
In spite of the plain language of the rule, the district courts of ap-
peal apparently are not in accord as to whether a motion for summary
judgment should be denied when the proofs raise issues of material fact
not raised by the pleadings.
In Mark Leach Health Furniture Co. v. Thal 96 the plaintiff appealed
from an adverse judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice when
he failed to appear at the trial. The action was based upon a promissory
note and the defendant's answer to the complaint was a general denial.29
On the plaintiff's request for admissions of fact,298 the defendant had
admitted all of the material allegations of the complaint, but had stated
additional facts which, if proved, would establish an affirmative defense
of failure of consideration. The defendant's affidavit in opposition to
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment tended further to sub-
stantiate his affirmative defense. Nevertheless, the second district court
of appeal held that the trial court had erred in denying the plaintiff's
motion when the defendant's admissions resolved all of the issues raised
by the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and when the defendant did
not seek to amend his answer to include additional allegations of fact,
since affirmative defenses not raised in the answer are deemed waived.29
It is submitted that such a conclusion contravenes the language and the
spirit of the rules, which are designed as a means and not as an end.
The position of the Third District Court of Appeal, as expressed in
Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack,8"' appears to comport much better with
the liberal purpose of the rules to release justice from the chains of
294. Babb v. Lincoln Auto Finance Co., 133 So.2d 566 (Fla. Dist. 1961).
295. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c).
296. 143 So.2d 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
297. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(c).
298. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.30(a).
299. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
300. 145 So.2d 285 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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form. In affirming an order denying the defendant's motion for a sum-
mary judgment in a negligence action, the appellate court held that
"[w] here the facts show an issue not framed in the pleadings, the trial
judge will not be reversed for failing to grant a summary judgment, even
though his failure to enter a directed verdict might be error if the same
situation existed at the close of the plaintiff's case." 0' 1
Florida courts refuse to consider affidavits in support of or opposed
to a motion unless they have been filed prior to the date of the actual
hearing.802
d. Competent Evidence
Summary judgment proceedings are evidentiary in nature, intended
as a means of terminating litigation when nothing would be accomplished
by a further investment of time and money in a trial on the merits. 0 3
When the plaintiff moves for a summary judgment or decree, he has
the burden of proving each material allegation of his complaint prior to
being entitled to such a judgment or decree as a matter of law.804 If the
defendant has answered and has asserted an affirmative defense, the
plaintiff's affidavit in support of his motion must refute it.
80 5
• . . [S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy .... In the ab-
sence of some proof contradicting or denying or in opposition
thereto, the mere pleading of this affirmative defense created
a genuine issue so as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The defendants
were under no duty to submit evidentiary matter to establish
their affirmative defense.8 0 6
Once the movant has met his burden of establishing his right to
summary relief by the introduction of adequate competent evidence, the
adverse party can no longer rest on the paper issues created by the
pleadings, but he must overcome the movant's proof with adequate evi-
dence of his own.80 7 The issues raised by affidavits may be overcome by
testimony contained in depositions 08 and, even, by findings of fact in
another related suit between the same parties.
In Jenkins v. Dickeys09 the defendant in an action on a promissory
301. Id. at 286.
302. Hardcastle v. Mobley, 143 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Siciliano v. Hunerberg,
135 So.2d 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
303. Edgewater Drugs, Inc. v. Jax Drugs, Inc., 138 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
304. Langley v. New Deal Cab Co., 138 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
305. Skaf's Jewelers, Inc. v. Antwerp Import Corp., 150 So.2d 260 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
306. Harrison .v. McCourtney, 148 So.2d 53, 55-56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (Emphasis
added.)
307. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c); Gibbs v. American Nat'l Bank, 155 So.2d 651 (Fla. Ist
Dist. 1963) ; City of Tarpon Springs v. Gerecter, 155 So.2d 566 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) ; Lanz-
ner v. City of North Miami Beach, 141 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
308. Rosenhouse v. Kimbrig, 147 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
309. 151 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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note appealed from an adverse summary judgment. The motion had
been supported and opposed by affidavits which appeared to create gen-
uine issues of material fact. However, there had previously been a chat-
tel mortgage foreclosure suit between the same parties in which the de-
fendant had asserted the same defenses that were raised by the affidavit
in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment. The
issues in that suit were resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The record in
the equity suit was before the court in the action at law on the promis-
sory note. In affirming the summary judgment, the appellate court held
that the trial court had properly taken judicial notice of the chancery
proceedings when the record of those proceedings indicated that sub-
stantially the same defenses had been resolved in the plaintiff's favor
after a hearing on the merits in the foreclosure suit.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiiant is com-
petent to testify to the matters stated herein. 810
Such affidavits may not be based on hearsay evidence8 ' or conclu-
sions of law 12 nor may they allege a parol agreement when parol evi-
dence would be inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement
in an action on a contract. 13
e. Review of Summary Judgments
The rules now provide for a motion to rehear a summary judg-
ment,1  which must be made within 10 days of its entry. 15 Once the
time within which such a motion may be filed has lapsed, the trial court
loses jurisdiction of the cause, and, unless the requirements of Rule
1.38... have been met, the appropriate method of review is by appeal.117
When a notice of appeal is filed by the same party who has filed a
timely and "undisposed of" petition for a rehearing, the petition for a
rehearing is deemed abandoned, and the appellate court acquires juris-
diction to hear the appeal. However, while there is pending a timely
310. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(e).
311. Harrison v. Consumers Mortgage Co., 154 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
312. Deerfield Beach Bank v. Mager, 140 So.2d 120 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
313. Evans v. Borkowski, 139 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
314. FLA. R. CIV. P. 2.8(a).
315. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(b).
316. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38 provides for relief from judgments, orders or decrees in cases
when there has been a clerical mistake or when an error has resulted from a mistake, in-
advertence or excusable neglect, or fraud or is shown to have been made by newly discov-
ered evidence, which was in existence at the time of the trial, but could not have been dis-
covered in the exercise of due diligence then.
317. State v. Gooding, 149 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). The trial court lacked juris-
diction to vacate a summary decree on plaintiff's motion filed 36 days after the decree was
entered.
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petition for a rehearing of the adverse party, a party may not file a notice
of appeal.""
I L. Relief from Judgments, Decrees, or Orders
In a negligence action, the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to vacate a default judgment on the ground that its failure to answer
was occasioned by the negligent inadvertence of its administrative staff
in not relaying the summons and the copy of the complaint to its counsel.
Thereafter, the defendant prevailed on its motion for a summary judg-
ment, and the plaintiff appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the court
to vacate the default and charging an abuse of judicial discretion. While
the district court acknowledged the inherent power of the trial court
over its interlocutory orders, it held319 that the lower court had abused
its discretion, because the inadvertence of one's administrative employees
was not sufficiently good cause to justify setting aside the default. Rein-
statement of the default was ordered. The supreme court granted the
defendant's petition for certiorari and in a far-reaching opinion reversed
the district court decision and remanded the cause for further pro-
ceedings.32 ° It noted that motions to vacate defaults should be liberally
construed in favor of the movant to permit an adjudication on the merits,
and that a century earlier it had recognized 2' that the inadvertence of
an agent was not such gross and culpable negligence of the defendant
as would preclude the vacation of a default order.
Clerical mistakes may be corrected at any time before the record
on appeal is docketed without the appellate court's permission and, there-
after, with its permission. 22 Other relief from orders, judgments and
decrees may be had within a reasonable time, which in the case of mis-
take, in advertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evi-
dence, fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party
shall not be longer than one year after the decree, order or judgment has
been entered. 2
Hartley v. Hartley324 is an interesting case in which a wife received
notice of the hearing on her husband's petition to modify a final divorce
318. Scott-Whitaker Co. v. Joyce Properties, Inc., 155 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
319. Barber v. North Shore Hosp. Inc., 133 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
320. North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1962). Prior to this deci-
sion, the third district court of appeals had granted certiorari to reverse a trial court order
in a negligence action arising out of an automobile collision on the ground that the defend-
ant co-owner had failed to answer the complaint because he had thought that his co-defend-
ant had responded. On the handing down of the decision in the principal case the district
court granted a rehearing and denied the petition for certiorari. Martin v. Pattison, 144
So.2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). See also Ross v. Baird, 143 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
321. Waterson v. Seat, 10 Fla. 326 (1863).
322. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(a).
323. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b); Sun Fin. Corp. v. Friend, 139 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1962).
324. 134 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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decree and terminate his obligation to make alimony payments on the
day after the hearing had been held. The court denied both the wife's
motion to quash the order terminating the husband's obligation and her
later motion to vacate the order which was supported by affidavits in-
dicating that she was in New York when the notice was mailed and had
a meritorious defense to the petition. On appeal, the district court com-
mented that. a motion to vacate is not subject to the 10-day limitation
of a motion to quash. In reversing the order the appellate court held
that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the former wife's
motion as she was unquestionably entitled to adequate and proper notice
of the new proceedings and to an opportunity to be heard before modifica-
tion of a decree affecting her rights could be entered.
When the basis for a motion to vacate is one subject to the one-year
limitation under the Rule, the time for making it is not tolled by taking
an appeal. 2 ' Neither is the time for taking an appeal tolled by filing a
motion to vacate.
II. AcTIONS AT LAW ONLY
A. Jury Trials
1. WAIVER
The absolute right to a trial by jury exists only in such cases as has
been declared by the Constitution or by statute.326 In other cases jury
trials are permissive, not mandatory. 27 Even when an absolute right to
a jury trial exists, it may be waived by failure to make a timely de-
mand . 8 Thereafter, the right to a trial by jury is discretionary with the
court.129 The plaintiff was found to have waived his right to a jury trial
in an action to recover damages for breach of contract when he dismissed
his complaint containing a timely demand for a jury trial against the
original defendants and subsequently filed an amended complaint, not
containing such a demand against the defendant appellee. In affirming
the trial court's order denying the plaintiff a jury trial, the appellate
court held that the amended complaint did not relate back3 0 to the
date of original complaint and that the right to a jury trial had been
waived by the plaintiff's failure to make a timely demand.83 1
The defendant in a suit to foreclose an architect's lien filed a com-
pulsory legal counterclaim for damages for the alleged negligent per-
formance of the plaintiff's services and made a timely demand for a jury
" 325. Seven-Up Bottling Co., Inc. v. George Constr. Corp., 156 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
326. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.1(a).
327. Gerstein v. "Pleasure Was My Business," 136 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
328. FiA. R. CiV. P. 2.1(b); Phillips v. Blum, 139 So.2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
329. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(e) ; Bittner v. Walsh, 132 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
330. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c).
331. Bardee Corp. v. Arnold Altex Aluminum Co., 134 So.2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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trial of the issues presented by the counterclaim. On the plaintiff's mo-
tion, the trial court struck the demand for a jury trial and the defendant
took an interlocutory appeal. The district court affirmed the order on
the ground that the legal issues of the counterclaim were so interwoven
with the equitable issues of the principal suit that granting the counter-
claimant's demand for a jury trial rested in the exercise of the chancel-
lor's broad discretionary power.
The defendants sought supreme court review of this decision 3 2 by
the dual approach of a petition for certiorari based on conflicting deci-
sions and by direct appeal on the theory that the district court had in-
itially construed a controlling provision of the Florida Constitution.3 3
After consolidating the appeals for its consideration and disposition, the
supreme court held that when a litigant has made a timely demand for
a jury trial of legal issues triable as of right by a jury, the court must
grant the demandant's request. Prior to the adoption of the rules, the
defendant in an equitable suit was not obligated to file a legal counter-
claim. Under present Florida practice, the defendant is obligated to file
any claim legal or equitable that he may have against the plaintiff
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or be forever barred
from prosecuting that claim.3 The court found that an interpretation
of the rule permitting the defendant to waive his absolute right to a jury
trial of a compulsory legal counterclaim by asserting it in an equitable
action would render the rule unconstitutional. 35 In dictum the court
indicated that a timely demand for a jury trial would preserve the de-
fendant's right to such a trial even if the legal counterclaim were permis-
sive.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal coun-
terparts336 to Florida Rules 1.13 (1) and 2.1 in the light of the seventh
amendment 33 7 and has reached a similar conclusion. 35
2. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF JURORS
On the trial of any civil cause in any court each party [is] en-
titled to three peremptory challenges of jurors; provided, that
where the number of parties on opposite sides ... are unequal,
[each side shall have] the same aggregate number of peremp-
tory challenges [to be divided as provided by the statute] .39
332. Hightower v. Bigoney, 145 So.2d 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
333. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 3: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to
all and remain inviolate forever."
334. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1).
335. Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1963).
336. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), § 38.
337. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
338. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See 2B BARRON & HOLT-
zoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 894 (Wright ed. 1961); WIGH'T, FEDERAL COURTS,
§ 92, at 353-56 (1963).
339. FLA. STAT. § 54.11 (1963).
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A negligence action was brought by a husband and wife, in which
the husband sought to recover for his own personal injuries in addition
to his claim for expenses incurred for treatment of his wife's injuries.
The appellate court held that the trial court had committed reversible
error in denying the defendant the same number of peremptory chal-
lenges as the plaintiffs had been granted. 4 °
In an ejectment action, the trial court erroneously permitted each
side an excessive number of peremptory challenges because it had failed
to treat multiple parties with a common interest as a single party. How-
ever, "error in a matter concerning a jury must be prejudicial to be
reversible [and] the allowance of an excessive number of peremptory
challenges is not a ground for reversal of [a] judgment based upon the
verdict rendered where it appears that the jury was impartial. ' 4'
B. Jury Instructions
In an action for damages incurred in a railroad crossing accident,
the court independently instructed the jury on the statutory presumption
of negligence. After the jury had retired the defendant moved for a mis-
trial which the court denied. In allowing the defendant the advantage
of his motion on appeal from an adverse judgment, the appellate court
held that the requirement in the rules 42 that a party must object to
proposed jury instructions at the conference called for that purpose or
be precluded from assigning such charges as error did not apply to an
instruction given by the court without prior notice. Further, it was un-
necessary for the defendant to object to such instruction before the jury
retired, since the unfavorable impression created by the erroneous charge
could not easily be removed from the minds of the jurors. 43
The plaintiff sought damages for trespass to land and requested
the court to instruct the jury concerning the burden of proving an affirma-
tive defense in the defendant's answer. The requested instruction was
denied. On appeal from an adverse judgment, the district court held that
the plaintiff's failure to object to the denial of his requested instruction
did not bar appellate review of its propriety, when he had filed written
requests. 44 One need only object to a proposed instruction-not to the
denial of a proposed instruction. 4
340. Funland Park, Inc. v. Dozier, 151 So.2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
341. Bailey v. Deverick, 142 So.2d 775, 777 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
342. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(b).
343. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Flournoy, 136 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
344. Hattaway v. Florida Power & Light Co., 133 So.2d 101 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
345. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(b) provides:
[I]t shall be the duty of the parties to the cause to file written requests that the
court charge the jury as set forth in such requests. The court shall then require
counsel to appear before it for the purpose of a conference to settle the charges to
be given. At such conference all objections shall be made and ruled upon ....
No party may assign as error the giving of any charge unless he objects thereto at
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In Jayess Investments, Ltd. v. Barbee Foods, Inc. 4 " the court held
that the defendant was precluded from appellate review of the trial
court's alleged error in failing to instruct the jury generally on the sub-
ject of the defendant's claim of right. The case involved a tenant's action
against his landlord to recover damages for an alleged wrongful termina-
tion of the tenant's occupancy of the premises under a lease. The rules
3 47
require a party to request a proper instruction before he can claim error
for failure to give instruction.
C. Directed Verdict
1. IN GENERAL
Florida courts.48 have espoused "the most favorable evidence rule"
in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted.
Under this view, the court is not warranted in granting a motion for a
directed verdict unless the evidence as a whole, with all reasonable de-
ductions to be drawn therefrom, points to only one possible conclusion.
Such a motion should be granted with great caution in comparative negli-
gence cases, such as actions governed by admiralty law349 and actions
based upon railroad crossing accidents. 5 ' When the doctrine of com-
parative negligence obtains, a plaintiff's contributory negligence reduces
the amount of damages recoverable, but it does not bar recovery. In
such cases, a motion for a directed verdict may be granted only when
the evidence is legally insufficient to establish any liability on the de-
fendant's part and necessarily includes a judicial finding that the sole
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was his own negligence.8 5'
In a malpractice suit against his former attorney, the plaintiff ap-
pealed from a judgment entered pursuant to a verdict directed for the
defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff had been in-
jured in the course of his employment, allegedly by the negligence of
a third-party tortfeasor. Thereafter, he employed the defendant to
prosecute an action against the alleged tortfeasor, but the defendant
neglected to do so within one year, thus subjecting the plaintiff to the
statutory provision35 2 which permits a Workmen's Compensation in-
surance carrier to bring an action against the alleged tortfeasor if the
insured party has not done so. The tortfeasor-defendant in the insurance
such time, nor the failure to give any charge unless he shall have requested the
same. (Emphasis added.)
346. 155 So.2d 853 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
347. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6.
348. See, e.g., Garris v. Robeison, 146 So.2d 388 (Fla., 2d Dist. 1962) ; Jones v. Royal
Palm Ice Co., 145 So.2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) ; Massaline v. Rich, 137 So.2d 10 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1962).
349. Cashell v. Hart, 143 So.2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
350. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Haywood, 145 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Ely v.
Atlantic Coastline R.R., 138 So.2d 521 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
351. Ely v. Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co., supra note 350.
352. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(4)(a) (1963).
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carrier's action had propounded interrogatories to the plaintiff. In the
instant action there was' competent testimony which, if believed by a
jury, would establish that the plaintiff had relied on the defendant-at-
torney's advice in failing to answer the interrogatories propounded to
him in the carrier's action. The carrier's suit was dismissed with preju-
dice. 58 A subsequent suit against the third-party tortfeasor, brought by
the defendant on his client's- behalf, was also dismissed when the tort-
feasor asserted the affirmative defense of res judicata. In reversing the
judgment entered on the verdict directed for the defendant, the appellate
court noted that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury might
infer that the defendant had
wanted the suit dismissed, and used the interrogatories as a
means of procurring that result. [He may not have wished it]
dismissed with prejudice although this was the . . . result. An
attorney practicing as an officer of the court is charged with
the knowledge that under the Rules of Procedure the action
of his client in refusing to submit to discovery may subject that
client to the possibility of the loss of his cause of action.854
It is interesting to note that the court, by way of obiter dictum, com-
mented that involuntary dismissals for failure to comply with the rules
were automatically with prejudice unless otherwise provided and that
that portion of the rule remains unchanged by the revision of the Rules
in 1962.111 It is submitted that the restatement of Rule 1.35(b) in three
paragraphs was designed to accomplish precisely the opposite result and
that, as now worded, an involuntary dismissal for failure to comply with
the rules is automatically without prejudice unless the order of dismissal
otherwise provides. 850
2. DIRECTED VERDICT-NON-APPEARANCE AT TRIAL
When the appealing plaintiffs had failed to appear at the appointed
time, the court proceeded with the trial and directed the jury to return
a verdict adverse to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability and for the
$75,000 damages which the plaintiffs had sought. The district court af-
firmed the judgment and sustained the order denying the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial. The appealing parties had had notice of the im-
pending trial and their failure to appear emanated from their own mis-
take.85
7
3. DIRECTED VERDICT-JURY NOT PRESENT
After the jury had been empanelled and prior to the commencement
of the trial, the plaintiff amended his complaint with the court's permis-
353. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.35(b).
354. Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
355. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962).
356. See notes 216, 217 supra and accompanying text.
357. Holt Industries, Inc. v. Airtronics Int'l Corp., .139 So.2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
sion. While the jury was still not present, a colloquy occurred between
the judge and the litigants' attorneys which terminated in the court's
decision that the case was controlled by a statute urged by the de-
fendant. The court announced that it would treat the previous discussion
as the plaintiff's opening remarks to the jury and direct a verdict for
the defendant. The district court reversed holding that a verdict may
not be directed at the conclusion of the voir dire (opening statements) . 858
4. NEW TRIAL MOTION NOT PREREQUISITE TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF AN
ORDER DENYING A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
On appeal from an adverse judgment in an automobile negligence
action, the plaintiff urged as error the denial of his motion for a directed
verdict on the issue of liability. It should have left for the jury's determi-
nation the issue of which of the two defendants was negligent or whether
they were jointly liable. The defendant asserted that the appellate court
could not review the order denying the plaintiff's motion when the plain-
tiff had not moved for a new trial prior to taking an appeal. The district
court disagreed. The issue on appeal was not whether the verdict was
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (for which a motion
for a new trial would have been a prerequisite to appellate review).
Rather, the test was whether there was any evidence in the record which
could lawfully support the jury's verdict for the defendants. Predicated
on the latter test, the appellate court held that the lower court had erred
in denying the plaintiff's motion because the record affirmatively es-
tablished that the plaintiff was free of any negligence which was the
proximate cause of the collision."'
5. ALTERNATIVE' MOTIONS FOR A RESERVED DIRECTED VERDICT
(JUDGMENT N.O.V.) AND FOR A NEW TRIAL-TIME
FOR APPEALING
Upon the return of a jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff
moved in the alternative for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial. The court
entered an order denying his motion for a new trial and the plaintiff ap-
pealed., The appeal was dismissed on the defendant's motion because it
only sought review of the order denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial and the record did not indicate the disposition of his motion for
judgment n.o.v. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order correcting
358. Croom-Johnson, Inc. v. Rand Broadcasting Co., 139 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1962).
359. Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). There was a dissenting
opinion which reasoned that the trial court had properly denied the plaintiff's motion for
a directed verdict. Where either of the defendants against whom a directed verdict was
sought would have been entitled to a jury verdict and judgment inhis favor, the jury ought
not to be placed in the position of having to decide against one of them, since under the
evidence, it could have found for either of the defendants.
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and clarifying the order previously appealed, so that the record would
correctly reflect nunc pro tunc that both motions had been disposed of
in the original order. Again the plaintiff appealed and the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal-this time on the ground that the
60 days had passed and the appeal was untimely."' In denying the
motion to dismiss the appeal, the appellate court noted that a timely
appeal for judgment notwithstanding the verdict tolls the time for taking
an appeal.61 and that an order on a motion has not been rendered until
it has been written, signed and made a matter of record. 62 On this basis,
the motion for judgment n.o.v. was not disposed of until the second
order was entered. The nunc pro tunc provision of that order could not
operate to adversely affect the running of the appeal time.363
D. New Trial
1. SUSPENSION OF THE 10 DAY LIMITATION PROVISION
In a case of first impression in Florida 64 it was held that, when
there has been a timely motion for a new trial and/or for judgment
n.o.v., the court may grant a new trial on its own initiative for a reason
not stated in the motion even though more than 10 days have passed
from the rendition of the verdict. Once the finality of the judgment has
been suspended865 by a timely motion for a new trial or for a reserved
directed verdict, the reason for the 10 day limitation disappears.
The holding of the Kaufman case was incorporated into the rules
by a 1962 amendment:
Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment or within the
time of ruling on ... a timely motion for a new trial made by
a party in actions tried by a jury, the court of its own initia-
tive may order a rehearing or a new trial for any reason for
which it might have granted a rehearing or a new trial on
motion of a party.366 (Emphasis added.)
2. MUST A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BE FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS?
Miami Transit Co. v. Ford3 67 posed the interesting question of
whether a motion for a new trial which had been served on the plaintiff's
counsel within the required 10-day period36 would be untimely if not
filed with the clerk of the court until 6 days later when the stipulated
360. FLA. App. R. 3.2(b).
361. FLA. App. R. 1.3.
362. Ibid.
363. Stupp v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135 So*2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
364. Kaufman v. Sweet Et Al. Corp., 144 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
365. FLA. App. R. 1.3.
366. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(d).
367. 149 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist.), rev'd, 155 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1963).
368. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(b).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
grace period had run. The motion was denied and the defendant ap-
pealed. The district court concluded that late filing had rendered the
motion untimely and ineffective to toll the running of the time for
taking an appeal" 9 and held that the appeal, filed 72 days after judg-
ment had been entered, was thus untimely and dismissed. The supreme
court granted certiorari. In reversing, it was held that only service of
the motion within the 10 day period is critical under the rules.370 The
provision371 that "[a]ll original papers, copies of which are required
to be served upon parties, shall be filed with the court either before
service or immediately thereafter" should be interpreted in the light of
its federal counterpart.372 "Immediately" in the Florida rules should
be interpreted to mean the same meaning as the corresponding phrase
"within a reasonable time" in Federal Rule 5 (d).
3. NEW TRIAL MOTION NOT PREREQUISITE TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
By statutory provision 3' an appellate court in Florida may review
an alleged erroneous charge to the jury, even though no exception or
objection was taken to the ruling and even though no motion was made
for a new trial. 74
4. APPELLATE REVIEW OF NEW TRIAL ORDERS
Although an order granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict
was so excessive as to "shock the court's judicial conscience" is an exer-
cise of the broad discretionary power inherent in the court's authority,375
a trial court's judicial conscience is not exempt from appellate review."'
[A] new trial should be granted only where substantial rights
have been so violated as to make it reasonably clear that a fair
trial was not had. It is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial
when the verdict finds ample support in the record and no ille-
gal evidence is shown to have gone to the jury and nothing can
be accomplished except to have another jury review the
cause .... 377
However, "it requires a stronger showing to upset an order granting a
motion for a new trial than an order denying one.
' 7
369. FLA. App. R. 1.3, 3.2(b).
370. FLA. R. Crv. P. 2.8(b).
371. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.4(d) (Emphasis added.)
372. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
373. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(2) (1963).
374. Smith v. McCullough Dredging Co., 152 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
375. MacLaughlin v. Red Top Cab and Baggage Co., 133 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
376, Bailey v. Sympson, 148 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
377. Cobb v. Brew, 155 So.2d 814, 815-16, (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
378. Russo v. Clark, 147 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1962), affirming 133 So.2d 764 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1961).
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5. NEW TRIAL ORDER MUST STATE GROUNDS
During the survey period, the Florida bench and bar have demon-
strated a continuing disregard for section 59.07(4) of the Florida Stat-
utes 79 and for Rule 2.8(f)."' Both provide that in actions tried by a
jury every order granting a new trial shall specify the particular and
specific grounds therefore. Case law has construed the language to be
mandatory. 8 '1 It is immaterial that reference to the motion will reveal
the grounds for the order.882
III. SUITS IN EQUITY ONLY
A. Intervention
Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any
time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the
intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of,
the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered
by the court in its discretion.888
In a suit for additional alimony, etc., the petitioning corporation took
an interlocutory appeal from an order denying its petition to intervene.
The court had entered an order impounding rents due the appealing
petitioner. In reversing the order, the appellate court found that the
petitioner came directly within the purview of Rule 3.4 and that the order
impounding the rents was an unconstitutional interference with contract
rights and denial of due process when the petitioner had not been served
and made a party to the suit.884
B. Class Action
The plaintiff, in a taxpayer's suit for declaratory and other relief,
was held8 5 to have met the requirements for maintaining a class action
under the rules.88 ' Although the determination that a suit is a class action
must depend upon the facts in the individual case, the court887 suggested
the following guide lines:
(1) The complaint should allege facts showing the necessity
379. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1963).
380. FLA. R. CIV. P. 2.8(f).
381. State Rd. Dept. v. Mutillo, 155 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Hutchins v. City
of Hialeah, 153 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); A. & P. Bakery Supply & Equip. Co. v.
H. Hexter & Son, Inc., 149 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Morton v. Staples, 141 So.2d
806 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) ; Webb's City Inc. v. Lugerner, 138 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962);
Ponte v. Lattin, 135 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
382. Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., 150 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1963), reversing 142 So.2d 745
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
383. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 3.4.
384. St. Anne Airways, Inc. v. Webb, 142 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
385. Port Royal, Inc. v. Conboy, 154 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
386. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 3.6.
387. Port Royal, Inc. v. Conboy, supra note 385, at 736-37.
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for bringing the action as a class suit and the plaintiff's
right to represent the class.
(2) The plaintiff should allege that he brings the suit on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated.
(3) The complaint should allege the existence of a class, de-
scribed with some degree of certainty, and that members of
the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court.
(4) It should be made clear that the plaintiff adequately rep-
resents the class; generally, the interest of the plaintiff
must be coextensive with the interest of the other members
of the class.
(5) A class suit is maintainable where the subject of the action
presents a question of common or general interest, and
where all the members of the class have a similar interest
in obtaining the relief sought.
(6). The common or general interest must be in the object of the
action, in the result sought to be accomplished in the pro-
ceedings, or in the question involved in the action. There
must be a common right of recovery based upon the same
essential facts.
C. Setting Aside a Default
When a defendant in an equity suit has defaulted in answering the
complaint, the court may proceed to a decree which will become final,
unless the court shall vacate the default or enlarge the time for serving
an answer for cause shown upon motion and affidavit within 10 days
of the entry of the decree. 88 Failure to file the motion within the stipu-
lated 10-day period is jurisdictional. 89 Failure to file an affidavit with
the motion will preclude its consideration where "the grounds of the
application to open a default are [not] evident on the face of the
record. ' 190 Although granting a motion to vacate a default is discretionary
with the court, "in a case of reasonable doubt, where there has been
no trial upon the merits, the discretion of the trial judge is usually exer-
cised in favor of granting the application so as to permit a determination
of the controversy upon its. merits." ''
D. Interpleader
To avoid double or multiple liability the rules 92 now provide for
interpleader-both strict interpleader and a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader. The device is available both to defendants and to plaintiffs.3 93
388. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.10.
389. Hickman v. Hickman, 147 So.2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
390. Thomason v. Jernigan, 146 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
391. Simon v. Leach, 148 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
392. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.13.
393. Ibid. See also Bradford Builders, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 154 So.2d 189
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments To The Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 17 U. MIA i L. REV. 276, 302 (1962).
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In the case of strict interpleader, the initiating party is a mere stake-
holder of a common fund or thing to which two or more persons claim
the right of ownership through a common source. The stakeholder has
no interest in the subject matter of the litigation, is not independently
liable to any of the claimants, and has not in any way contributed to the
existence of the conflicting claims. 94 In Riverside Bank of Jacksonville
v. Florida Dealers and Growers Bank,39  the First District Court held
that a counterclaim may properly be asserted when the action is a bill
in the nature of interpleader rather than one for strict interpleader.
E. Rehearing
No rehearing shall be granted unless the petition is served within
ten days after the recording of the decree.39 6 In Bradford Builders, Inc. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co. 9 ' a building contractor brought suit to determine
the rights of the respective parties against its employer and various sub-
contractors employed by the builder. The court entered an order dis-
missing the corporate defendant, conditioned upon its payment into the
registry of the amount alleged to be due; then the plaintiff moved to
amend the order to require the corporate defendant to pay interest in
addition to the principal amount. The court denied the plaintiff's motion
on the ground that it had not reserved jurisdiction in the dismissal order
and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to compute interest even if owed.
On the plaintiff's appeal, the appellate court disagreed. It held that the
motion to amend was equivalent to a petition for a rehearing9 8 and that,
within the purview of that rule, "within" means "not later than." There-
fore, "[a] timely petition for a rehearing after a final decree preserves
the jurisdiction of court for the purpose of disposing of the petition on
its merits, even if filed after announcement, but before the decree is
actually entered. '3
99
The appellee moved to dismiss an appeal taken 61 days after the
recording of a final decree as untimely. In denying the motion, the district
court held4"' that it was incumbent upon the movant to establish whether
or not a timely petition for a rehearing had been filed. Although a petition
for a rehearing does not operate to stay the proceedings unless so ordered
by the court, 0 1 it does toll the time for taking an appeal. 40 2
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